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593 
SOSA V. ALVAREZ-MACHAIN1 AND THE ALIEN TORT 
STATUTE: HOW WIDE HAS THE DOOR TO HUMAN 
RIGHTS LITIGATION BEEN LEFT OPEN? 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Activists are pulling with all their might to open the door to human 
rights litigation in the United States federal courts.2  At the same time, 
the Bush administration, multinational corporations, and some members 
of the Supreme Court are leaning heavily against that door, summoning 
the weight of history and tradition to keep it shut.3  This struggle exists 
because of the near-dormant state of the Alien Tort Statute (ATS)4 since 
its enactment as a component of the Judiciary Act of 1789.5  Neither the 
Supreme Court nor Congress has made a thorough determination as to 
what claims aliens can bring for violation of the “law of nations”6 before 
 
 1. 542 U.S. 692 (2004). 
 2. Marcia Coyle, Justices Open Door with Alien Tort Case, THE RECORDER, July 8, 2004, at 
1 (remarking that human rights proponents “lost the battle but won the war” with the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain and would persist with other pending Alien Tort 
Statute suits). 
 3. Warren Richey, When Can Foreigners Sue in US Courts?, THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE 
MONITOR, March 30, 2004, at 2 (reporting that the outcome of the Sosa case is of “great interest to 
US-based multinational corporations” that are being increasingly named as defendants in human 
rights litigation).  The suits brought against these multinational corporations under the ATS “allege 
that the companies are aiding and abetting the human rights abuses of the host government.”  Id. 
 4. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000).  This legislation is known interchangeably as the Alien Tort 
Statute, the Alien Tort Claims Act and the Alien Tort Act; throughout this paper it will be 
referenced as the Alien Tort Statute, or ATS, as is consistent with the Supreme Court’s language in 
Sosa.  See infra note 24 for both the modern and historical text of the ATS. 
 5. See infra notes 23-26 and accompanying text (providing the language of this Act and 
explaining its historical context).  See also infra notes 39-53 and accompanying text (discussing the 
dormant period of the ATS, beginning shortly after its enactment and extending until the Second 
Circuit’s decision in Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980)). 
 6. Black’s Law Dictionary cross references “law of nations” to the definition of 
“international law.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 903 (8th ed. 2004).  International law is “[t]he 
legal system governing the relationships between nations; more modernly, the law of international 
relations, embracing not only nations but also such participants as international organizations, 
multinational corporations, nongovernmental organizations, and even individuals (such as those 
who invoke their human rights or commit war crimes).” Id. at 835.  The author will primarily refer 
to this body of law as the “law of nations” rather than “international law” throughout this Note, as it 
is the language used in the Alien Tort Statute, see infra note 24, and in the Supreme Court’s 
1
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the federal courts.7 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain8 neither 
threw the door open nor shut it firmly.9  Instead, this decision 
perpetuates the uncertainty surrounding the ATS by leaving the door  
slightly ajar, suggesting that the issue will be revisited frequently as 
human rights issues push to the forefront of the national conscience.10  
Sosa acknowledges a remedy for violations of the modern day law of 
nations without enunciating exactly what that body of law entails.11  The 
Court gives hope to human rights activists that the ATS will provide a 
jurisdiction for the adjudication of severe international offenses, while 
acknowledging that not every international dispute will warrant a cause 
of action in the federal courts.12  The Court, cautiously tempering the 
ATS to a limited application, staves off a potential influx of alien claims 
to the federal court and, at least temporarily, appeases those corporations 
who might suffer an adverse effect.13  An analysis of the Court’s 
disposition in this case, then, is helpful to gauge the potential outcome of 
future human rights litigation and to explore the consequences that 
keeping the door ajar to alien claims might invite.14 
This Note will explore the Alien Tort Statute from its origin in 
1789 to the present interpretation of the Sosa Court.15  Part II will focus 
 
decision in Sosa.  Despite the arguably interchangeable use of these terms, “law of nations” is 
especially significant to this Note because of the controversy surrounding its meaning and intention. 
 7. Coyle, supra note 2, at 1.  As the “first substantive high court decision on the ATS in the 
statute’s history,” Sosa is the Supreme Court’s first attempt to flesh out some of the ambiguous 
elements of the ATS.  Id.  Congress has yet to bring the scope of the ATS up for discussion.  GARY 
CLYDE HUFBAUER & NICHOLAS K. MITROKOSTAS, AWAKENING MONSTER: THE ALIEN TORT 
STATUTE OF 1789, 49 (2003) (encouraging review of the ATS by Congress) [hereinafter HUFBAUER 
& MITROKOSTAS, AWAKENING MONSTER]; Gary Clyde Hufbauer & Nicholas K. Mitrokostas, 
International Implications of the Alien Tort Statute, 16 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 607, 624 (2004) 
(suggesting the same) [hereinafter Hufbauer & Mitrokostas, International Implications]. 
 8. 542 U.S. 692 (2004).  See supra Section III for the statement of the case. 
 9. Justice Scalia, in his concurring opinion, urges that the door be firmly shut.  Sosa, 542 
U.S. at 739 (Scalia, J., concurring).  The plurality leaves it open slightly. Id. at 746. 
 10. See infra notes 90-126 and accompanying text (discussing the plurality’s opinion which 
has this result). 
 11. See infra notes 90-126 and accompanying text (discussing the same). 
 12. Anthony J. Sebok, Is the Alien Tort Claims Act a Powerful Human Rights Tool?, CABLE 
NEWS NETWORK, July 12, 2004, http://www.cnn.com/2004/LAW/07/12/sebok.alien.tort.claims/ 
index.html (last visited March 20, 2006).  See infra notes 176-182 and accompanying text 
(discussing the connection between the ATS and potential human rights violations and the 
controversy surrounding this connection). 
 13. See infra notes 90-126 and accompanying text (presenting the plurality’s opinion). 
 14. See infra notes 176-196 and accompanying text (discussing these consequences from 
three aspects: human rights activists, multinational corporations, and the foreign policy objectives of 
the United States). 
 15. See infra notes 23-66 and accompanying text (setting forth the history of the ATS). 
2
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on the Framers’ language and intent, discuss the long lull in the use of 
the ATS and the impact of Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins,16 and examine a line 
of cases that reawakened the ATS in the 1980s.17 Part III explores the 
elements of the Court’s decision in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain: the facts 
that gave rise to an ATS claim, the plurality’s denial of jurisdiction, its 
dicta regarding potential application of the ATS, and Justice Scalia’s 
concurring opinion endorsing a very narrow and strict approach to the 
modern ATS.18  Part IV analyzes the possible interpretations and 
application of the Court’s decision,19 the efforts of human rights victims 
and activists to squeeze through the slightly ajar door of the ATS,20 the 
potential international and economic implications that may result from 
the Supreme Court’s failure to decisively shut the door on ATS 
litigation,21 and the role that Congress should play in redefining the 
purpose of the ATS.22 
II.  THE EVOLUTION OF THE ALIEN TORT STATUTE 
A.  Formation by the First Congress 
In 1789, two years after the ratification of the United States 
Constitution, the First Congress enacted the Judiciary Act.23  Among the 
 
 16. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).  See infra notes 39-53 and accompanying text (discussing the idle 
years of the ATS). 
 17. See infra notes 54-66 and accompanying text (discussing recent application of the ATS). 
 18. See infra notes 67-136 and accompanying text (setting forth a summary of the plurality’s 
opinion and Justice Scalia’s separate concurring opinion). 
 19. See infra notes 137-175 and accompanying text (addressing the directions that application 
of the Sosa decision could take). 
 20. See infra notes 176-182 and accompanying text (discussing the same). 
 21. See infra notes 183-196 and accompanying text (discussing the same). 
 22. See infra notes 197-200 and accompanying text (discussing the same). 
 23. An Act to Establish the Judicial Courts of the United States, 1st Cong., 1st Sess., ch. 20 
(1789) (available in 1 UNITED STATES STATUTES AT LARGE 73-93 (Richard Peters ed. 1845) 
[hereinafter First Congress, Judiciary Act of 1789]).  Article III, Section 1 of the United States 
Constitution established the Supreme Court and “such inferior Courts as the Congress may from 
time to time ordain and establish.” U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.  “The judicial Power shall extend to all 
Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and 
Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority.” U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.  From 
this meager framework, the First Congress fleshed out the role of the federal judiciary, defining the 
structure of the Supreme Court, creating the district and circuit courts, and further refining those 
instances in which the federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction. First Congress, Judiciary Act of 
1789, supra.  See generally Russell G. Donaldson, Construction and Application of Alien Tort 
Statute (28 U.S.C.A. § 1350), Providing for Federal Jurisdiction Over Alien’s Action for Tort 
Committed in Violation of Law of Nations or Treaty of the United States, 116 A.L.R. FED. 387 
(2004) (presenting an exhaustive overview of the Alien Tort Statute and an analysis of those federal 
3
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ways in which this Act expanded the federal judicial powers created in 
the Constitution, the Act specifically provided jurisdiction for actions 
brought by aliens for torts only.24  Although legislative history is 
sparse,25 scholars suspect that Congress included such a provision in the 
Judiciary Act to serve economic motives and bolster the United States’ 
fledgling presence on the international scene.26  The ATS was the 
framers’ way of “show[ing] European powers that the new nation would 
not tolerate flagrant violations of the ‘law of nations,’ especially when 
victims were foreign ambassadors or merchants.”27 
 
court cases which “have construed or applied this statute since its enactment”).  Oliver Ellsworth is 
credited with authoring the First Judiciary Act.  William S. Dodge, The Historical Origins of the 
Alien Tort Statute: A Response to the “Originalists,” 19 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 221, 222 
(1996) [hereinafter Dodge, Historical Origins].  The Judiciary Act has since been codified in Title 
28 of the United States Code.  See also William R. Casto, The Federal Courts’ Protective 
Jurisdiction Over Torts Committed in Violation of the Law of Nations, 18 CONN. L. REV. 467, 495 
(1986) (describing the non-controversial passage of the ATS). 
 24. First Congress, Judiciary Act of 1789, supra note 23, at 76-77.  The original language of 
the Judiciary Act of 1789, Section 9 began: “[t]he district courts shall have, exclusively of the courts 
of the States . . .” and then proceeded to specify instances in which the federal courts have exclusive 
jurisdiction.  Id.  The clause which would become known as the Alien Tort Statute (ATS) read: 
“[The district courts] shall also have cognizance, concurrent with the courts of the several States, or 
the circuit courts, as the case may be, of all cases where an alien sues for a tort only in violation of 
the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.”  Id. at 77.  The modern language of the ATS, 
codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1350 states: “The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil 
action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the 
United States.”  28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000).  Changes in phraseology were made at various redrafts of 
the United States Code to reflect language used in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  See id. at 
“Historical and Statutory Notes” (noting the substitution of “civil action” for “suits” consistent with 
the FRCP). 
 25. Casto, supra note 23, at 467 (calling the ATS, its origin and purpose, “obscure”).  See also 
Richey, supra note 3, at 2 (nicknaming the Sosa case “The Case of the Inscrutable Statute” because 
of the difficult task before the Supreme Court justices in interpreting a statute where “virtually no 
information exists explaining why Congress passed the [ATS]”). 
 26. Dodge, Historical Origins, supra note 23, at 222.  See also HUFBAUER & MITROKOSTAS, 
AWAKENING MONSTER, supra note 7, at 3 (noting U.S. response to “flagrant violations” against 
international figures as a precursor to the enactment of the ATS); John Haberstroh, The Alien Tort 
Claims Act & Doe v. Unocal: A Paquete Habana Approach to the Rescue, 32 DENV. J. INT’L L. & 
POL’Y 231, 236-37 (2004) (calling the ATS an attempt by the “militarily weak [United States] . . . to 
gain control over its voice in foreign relations”); Beth Stephens, Upsetting Checks and Balances: 
The Bush Administration’s Efforts to Limit Human Rights Litigation, 17 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 169, 
186 (2004) (identifying the crises between the United States and other nations over a series of 
“notorious incidents” as the need for the ATS).  “[D]espite considerable scholarly attention, it is fair 
to say that a consensus of what Congress intended [by the enactment of the ATS] has proven 
elusive.”  Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 718-19 (2004). 
 27. HUFBAUER & MITROKOSTAS, AWAKENING MONSTER, supra note 7, at 3.  The impetus for 
the ATS can be traced to a pair of assaults against foreign dignitaries while in the United States.  Id.  
See also infra note 28 (describing one of these triggering incidents, involving the French 
Ambassador Marbois).  The enactment of the ATS shortly following these incidents demonstrated 
that even “[e]arly in the history of the republic, Congress was evidently anxious to display 
4
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The inclusion of the ATS in the Judiciary Act reflects the First 
Congress’ distrust of the state courts’ ability and willingness to properly 
adjudicate aliens’ claims involving the law of nations.28  Having been 
entrusted with this duty by the Continental Congress in 1781, the state 
courts were left to their own common law interpretations of the law of 
nations and with the freedom to punish violations as they saw fit.29  Out 
of concern for the United States’ tenuous international status, the First 
 
American leadership in defending international standards of good behavior.”  HUFBAUER & 
MITROKOSTAS, AWAKENING MONSTER, supra note 7, at 3.  William Blackstone “explained that as a 
matter of municipal policy, a nation’s domestic law must implement the law of nations in order to 
preempt complaints by foreign sovereigns.”  Casto, supra note 23, at 489.  Economically speaking, 
the ATS granted a source of leverage to American merchants doing business internationally.  
Haberstroh, supra note 26, at 237.  Suppressed by the “belligerent nations” of the mercantile world, 
American merchants (and other vulnerable nations) could fight the war for free trade “by means of 
moral persuasion.” Id. 
 28. See Casto, supra note 23, at 495 (surmising that the newly convened Congress “surely 
remembered the Continental Congress’ ill-fated law of nations resolution”); Dodge, Historical 
Origins, supra note 23, at 234-35 (attributing the passage of the ATS as a means of assuring the law 
of nations violations would be resolved “regardless of the vagaries of state law”).  State courts had 
demonstrated their unwillingness to provide recourse for wronged aliens.  Haberstroh, supra note 
26, at 239.  Among the torts encompassed in the law of nations was the violation of treaties.  Id.  
See also First Congress, Judiciary Act of 1789, supra note 23, at 77 (creating jurisdictions for 
violation of the law of nations and treaties); infra note 35 (discussing the widely accepted 
understanding of what the “law of nations” encompassed).  However, the state courts refused to 
grant justice for one such treaty violation by refusing to aid British creditors in recovering debt 
promised them in a treaty ending the Revolutionary War.  Haberstroh, supra note 26, at 239.  The 
ATS would ensure that hostile state courts did not put the nation’s security at risk by angering a 
recent enemy or hinder the economy by angering a world power.  Id.; Casto, supra note 23, at 493 
(calling the “possibility that the United States might fail to provide an appropriate sanction or 
remedy” to law of nations violations “[t]he real foreign affairs problem”).  Even where the states 
acted to remedy a violation of the law of nations, the common law which empowered the state 
action was not always enough to safeguard the United States against an international predicament.  
Haberstroh, supra note 26, at 239.  For example, when a French Ambassador, Francis Barbe 
Marbois, was threatened in his Philadelphia home by another Frenchman, the Commonwealth of 
Pennsylvania successfully prosecuted the offender for a violation of the law of nations. Id.; Dodge, 
Historical Origins, supra note 23, at 229-30; Casto, supra note 23, at 491-93.  The absence of 
Pennsylvania common law allowing a corresponding tort claim resulted in a less-than-happy 
Ambassador Marbois and “international clamor ensued.”  Haberstroh, supra note 26, at 239.  
Issuing a resolution was the only remedy the federal government could employ to protect national 
security.  Sosa, 542 U.S at 717 n.11.  The resolution directed an apology to both Marbois and Louis 
XVI and an explanation of “‘the difficulties that may arise . . . from the nature of a federal union,’” 
as well as a plea “that ‘many allowances are to be made for’ the young nation.” Id. (citing 27 J. OF 
THE CONT. CONG. 503). 
 29. Dodge, Historical Origins, supra note 23, at 226-27.  The nation had, from its very start, 
become concerned with the need to “redress individual violations of the law of nations.” Id. at 226.  
See also Stephens, supra note 26, at 186 (citing the Continental Congress’ frequent attempts to 
encourage the states to punish these violations, both civilly and criminally, prior to the enactment of 
the ATS).  With this in mind the Continental Congress passed a resolution in 1781 requesting that 
the states so litigate such law of nations claims. Dodge, Historical Origins, supra note 23, at 226. 
5
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Congress enacted the ATS as a definitive statement that an alien’s claim 
for a violation of the law of nations could be adjudicated in the federal 
courts, rather than being left to the uncertainty and hostility of the state 
courts.30  The ATS, while not destroying state common law causes of 
action for the law of nations, created a concurrent jurisdiction in the 
federal courts,31 thereby assuring aliens – and signaling to world powers 
– that violations of the law of nations would be redressed in American 
courts.32 
The “law of nations,” as the Founding Fathers understood the 
notion, can be traced to the teachings of William Blackstone.33  
Blackstone theorized that “‘[t]he law of nations is a system of rules, 
 
 30. Dodge, Historical Origins, supra note 23, at 235-36.  See also supra notes 27-28 
(describing the international status motives behind the enactment of the ATS).  The potential for 
inconsistencies in the interpretation of the law of nations from state to state was distressing to the 
Founding Fathers who sought a consonant interpretation. Dodge, Historical Origins, supra note 23, 
at 235.  The authors of the Federalist Papers pointed to the need for federal jurisdiction in this 
instance on the bases of national security and a vibrant economy. Id. at 235-36.  James Madison 
blamed the hostility of state courts to the claims of aliens for the lack of  “‘wealthy gentlemen . . . 
trading or residing among us.’” Id. at 235 (quoting 3 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE 
CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 583 (J. Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1881)). 
Alexander Hamilton considered the barring of access to courts for the adjudication of these claims 
“‘among the just causes of war’” and therefore felt that “‘the federal judiciary ought to have 
cognizance of all causes in which the citizens of other countries are concerned.’”  Id. at 236 
(quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 80, at 476 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)).  In 
practice, the resolution of the Continental Congress was ineffective; it appears only one state passed 
a law to this effect.  Sosa, 542 U.S at 716 (citing FIRST LAWS OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT 82, 
83 (J. Cushing ed. 1982) (1784 compilation; exact date of Act unknown)).  In theory, however, 
“Congress had done what it could to signal a commitment to enforce the law of nations.”  Id. 
 31. See First Congress, Judiciary Act of 1789, supra note 23, at 77; 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000). 
 32. Dodge, Historical Origins, supra note 23, at 236. “The new Constitution gave Congress 
the authority to do what it could only recommend to the States in 1781.” Id. at 231.  See also Curtis 
A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, III, The Current Illegitimacy of International Human Rights 
Litigation, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 319, 360 (1997) (identifying the “major impetus” for the ATS as 
“unredressed attacks on ambassadors in the United States . . . that implicated the U.S. responsibility 
under international law”); Casto, supra note 23, at 481 (explaining that the judicial remedy provided 
by the ATS was “necessary in order to assuage the anger of foreign sovereigns”). 
 33. See Dodge, Historical Origins, supra note 23, at 225 (recognizing Blackstone’s influence 
in early American law).  William Blackstone, a British lawyer and contemporary of the Founding 
Fathers, lectured on English law at Oxford in the 1750s. Greg Bailey, Blackstone in America,  
available at http://earlyamerica.com/review/spring97/blackstone.html (last visited 4/7/2006).  The 
lectures were later published as Commentaries on the Laws of England.  Id. The Framers discovered 
their inspiration for the founding documents of the United States in Blackstone’s scientific approach 
to the law. Id.  But see Casto, supra note 23, at 505 and 505 n.210 (giving credit for the notion of 
law of nations to James Wilson, “an influential delegate to the Constitutional Convention”).  Wilson 
lectured on three branches of the law of nations in 1790 and 1791.  Id.  He identified “the law of 
nations as applied to state” (or the “current international law”), the “law of merchants” (or those 
laws which governed “private international business transactions”) and the “law maritime” (which 
encompassed admiralty).  Id. (internal quotations and footnotes omitted). 
6
Akron Law Review, Vol. 39 [2006], Iss. 2, Art. 7
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol39/iss2/7
DAMORE1.DOC 4/14/2006  1:15:04 PM 
2006] SOSA V. ALVAREZ-MACHAIN 599 
deducible by natural reason, and established by universal consent among 
the civilized inhabitants of the world.’”34  Blackstone suggested that 
“‘[t]he principle offences against the law of nations . . . are of three 
kinds; 1. Violation of safe-conducts; 2. Infringement of the rights of 
embassadors [sic]; and 3. Piracy.’”35  An insight to the intentions behind 
the ATS can be found in the language of the Continental Congress’ 
resolution issued to the states as a precursor to the enactment of the 
Judiciary Act.36 
In words that echo Blackstone, the congressional resolution called 
upon state legislatures to “provide expeditious, exemplary, and 
adequate punishment” for “the violation of safe conducts or 
passports, . . . of hostility against such as are in amity, . . . with the 
United States, . . . infractions of the immunities of ambassadors and 
other public ministers . . . [and] “infractions of treaties and conventions 
to which the United States are a party.”37 
Consistent with Blackstone’s influence, the First Congress likely 
intended the federal courts would have jurisdiction over these types of 
violations by virtue of the ATS.38 
 
 34. Dodge, Historical Origins, supra note 23, at 225-26 (quoting 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 
COMMENTARIES *68). 
 35. Id. at 226. (quoting 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *68); Casto, supra note 
23, at 490 (crediting Blackstone for establishing these primary violations of the law of nations). 
 36. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. at 716 (2004).  This resolution dates to 1781, eight 
years before the drafting of the ATS.  Id.  See supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text (discussing 
the federal government’s urging of the states to adjudicate aliens’ claims). 
 37. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 716 (citing 21 J. OF THE CONT. CONG. 1136-37 (G. Hunt ed. 1912)).  
The Resolution issued by the First Congress to the states also requested that the states “vest their 
courts with jurisdiction ‘to decide on offences against the law of nations, not . . . enumerate[d].’”  
Casto, supra note 23, at 490 (quoting 21 J. OF THE CONT. CONG. 1137 (1781) (penultimate resolve)). 
 38. Dodge, Historical Origins, supra note 23, at 232.  Blackstone’s law had already been 
absorbed into the common law of the states which the ATS was enacted to centralize.  Id. 
Violations of safe-conducts would typically involve assaults.  Violations of the rights of 
ambassadors could involve assault . . . or trespass and false imprisonment.  Acts of 
piracy could involve assault, trespass, and false imprisonment.  Violations of treaties 
could implicate a variety of torts, but it is apparent that assaults in violation of U.S. 
neutrality could violate a treaty. 
Id. at 232-33. 
That portion of the general common law known as the law of nations was understood to 
refer to the accepted practices of nations in their dealings with one another (treatment of 
ambassadors, immunity of foreign sovereigns from suit, etc.) and with actors on the high 
seas hostile to all nations and beyond all their territorial jurisdictions (pirates). 
Sosa, 542 U.S. at 749 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
7
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B.  Nearly 200 Years of Stagnancy 
Despite apparently pressing reasons for the inclusion of the Alien 
Tort Statute in the Judiciary Act, the jurisdiction it extended for the tort 
claims of aliens went essentially unused for nearly 200 years following 
its enactment.39  Invoked just over twenty times between 1789 and 
1980,40  the federal courts found jurisdiction under the ATS in only two 
of those cases.41  During this period, the ATS had effect as “principally a 
jurisdictional statute.”42  It was thought that “the ATS confided the 
power in federal district courts to hear tort cases brought by foreigners, 
but it did not (with limited exceptions) enumerate torts that could be the 
basis of a lawsuit.”43 
 
 39. Haberstroh, supra note 26, at 236.  “The ATS remained largely unnoticed and unused 
until 1980.” HUFBAUER & MITROKOSTAS, AWAKENING MONSTER, supra note 7, at 3.  Immediately 
following the 1789 passage of the ATS, a handful of events confirmed the need for such legislation.  
Casto, supra note 23, at 501.  Diplomat-related issues became especially pronounced with the 
outbreak of war between France and Great Britain in the early 1790s.  Id.  President Washington 
insisted on the neutrality of Americans toward the hostility, and proclaimed any assistance to either 
side a violation of the law of nations.  Id. at 502. 
 40. Haberstroh, supra note 26, at 236; Hufbauer & Mitrokostas, International Implications, 
supra note 7, at 609.  Two early cases broached the topic of the ATS, but neither relied on the ATS 
as the basis for jurisdiction.  Dodge, Historical Origins, supra note 23, at 252.  In both cases, the 
ATS “was asserted . . . as a supplement to the district courts’ admiralty and maritime jurisdiction.” 
Id.  The 1793 case of Moxon v. The Fanny, 17 F. Cas. 942 (D. Pa. 1793) (No. 9895), involved the 
commandeering of a British ship in U.S. waters by a French privateer. Dodge, Historical Origins, 
supra note 23, at 252.  The district court dismissed the case on other grounds, but did note 
parenthetically that the plaintiff’s claim under the ATS could not be maintained, despite its 
foundation in admiralty and maritime law, because it was not a suit for “tort only.”  Id.  In addition 
to damages, the claim also prayed for restitution of the ship.  Id. 
 41. Hufbauer & Mitrokostas, International Implications, supra note 7, at 609.  In Bolchos v. 
Darrel, 3 F. Cas. 810 (D. S.C. 1795) (No. 1607), the ATS served as the reserve jurisdictional basis 
for a claim involving another French privateer.  Dodge, Historical Origins, supra note 23, at 253.  
In this case the French privateer brought an action for the proceeds of the sale of slaves from a 
Spanish vessel he had captured at sea.  Id. An agent for the owner of the slaves later recovered the 
commandeered slaves and sold them. Id.  The district court held that if it “should refuse to take 
cognizance of the cause, there would be a failure of justice.”  Bolchos, 3 F. Cas. at 810.  Jurisdiction 
in the federal courts was established in this case because it was an admiralty claim, id., but, the 
court also stated: 
Besides, as the 9th section of the [J]udiciary [A]ct of [C]ongress gives this court 
concurrent jurisdiction with the state courts and circuit court of the United States where 
an alien sues for a tort, in violation of the law of nations, or a treaty of the United States, 
I dismiss all doubt upon this point. 
Id.; Dodge, Historical Origins, supra note 22, at 253.  In 1961, Adra v. Clift, 195 F.Supp. 857 
(D.Md. 1961) successfully found jurisdiction under the ATS.  Hufbauer & Mitrokostas, 
International Implications, supra note 7, at 609 n.14. 
 42. HUFBAUER & MITROKOSTAS, AWAKENING MONSTER, supra note 7, at 3. 
 43. Id.  Although many federal courts eventually began expanding the ATS to include a cause 
of action for the modern law of nations, most notably in Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 890 
(2d Cir. 1980) (holding that torture violated the law of nations such that the ATS provided 
8
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C.  Customary International Law44 and Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins45 
When the First Congress enacted the ATS in 1789, the law of 
nations existed as part of the general common law.46  One-hundred-fifty-
years later, in Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins,47 the Supreme Court struck down 
the concept of federal common law and required that federal courts use 
the law of the state in which they are situated.48  In theory, the decision 
in Erie should have had a significant impact on the ATS; the law of 
nations, as understood by the drafters of the ATS, was embodied in 
general common law.49  Likewise, any modern causes of action that the 
 
jurisdiction for an alien’s claim against another alien), see supra notes 54-66 (focusing on the 
Filartiga decision and related issues), some courts held true to the idea that the ATS did nothing 
more than “provid[e] a forum, but not a cause of action, for aliens suing in tort.”  Patrick D. Curran, 
Universalism, Relativism, and Private Enforcement of Customary International Law, 5 CHI. J. INT’L 
L. 311, 313-14, 314 n.12 (2004).  The supporters of this view would likely embrace the 
interpretation of the ATS as advanced by Judge Robert H. Bork in Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab 
Republic, 726 F.2d 774 (U.S. App. D.C. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1003 (1985).  Judge Bork 
adhered to a very strict “originalist” interpretation of the ATS. Dodge, Historical Origins, supra 
note 23, at 237.  Judge Bork’s decision, then, is in opposition to the Filartiga decision, on the basis 
of three principles: “(1) that an express cause of action is needed, which the Clause does not 
provide; (2) that the Clause should be limited to those torts that violated the law of nations in 1789; 
and (3) that the Clause should be limited to prize cases.”  Id. 
 44. Customary international law “is one of the principal sources or building blocks of the 
international legal system.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 835 (8th ed. 2004).  It is “[i]nternational 
law that derives from the practice of states and is accepted by them as legally binding.”  Id. 
 45. 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
 46. Leading Case: B. Alien Tort Statute, 118 HARV. L. REV. 446, 451 (2004) [hereinafter 
Leading Case].  The general common law was a “brooding omnipresence recognized rather than 
created by federal and state judges alike.”  Id. (internal quotation and footnote omitted).  The more 
formal definition of general federal common law is: 
[T]he judge-made law developed by federal courts in diversity-of-citizenship cases.  
Since Erie, a federal court has been bound to apply the substantive law of the state in 
which it sits.  So even though there is a ‘federal common law,’ there is no longer a 
general common law applicable to all disputes heard in federal court. 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 293 (8th ed. 2004). 
 47. 304 U.S. 64 (1938) (holding that there is no federal common law). 
 48. See generally Bradford R. Clark, Federal Common Law: A Structural Reinterpretation, 
144 U. PA. L. REV. 1245, 1278-85 (1996) (giving an overview of the Erie decision and its general 
denial of federal common law).  There are companion opinions that allow federal common law 
creation when it is “defined by express congressional authorization to devise a body of law 
directly.” Sosa, 542 U.S. at 726 (citing Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills of Ala., 353 U.S. 448 
(1957)).  See also Paul L. Hoffman & Daniel A. Zaheer, The Rules of the Road: Federal Common 
Law and Aiding and Abetting Under the Alien Tort Claims Act, 26 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. 
REV. 47, 60 (2003) (discussing a caveat to federal common law-making as exemplified in the 
Lincoln Mills case). See infra notes 150-165 and accompanying text (debating the intent of the ATS 
to authorize substantive lawmaking). 
 49. Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 32, at 331-32 (stating the position that there is “little 
doubt” that prior to the Erie decision, customary international law “had the status of general 
common law, not federal law”); see also Clark, supra note 48, at 1280-81 (noting the direct effect of 
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law of nations concept of the ATS could potentially accommodate would 
exist in customary international law, akin to the federal common law of 
the pre-Erie courts.50  Customary international law, which “results from 
a general and consistent practice of states followed by them from a sense 
of legal obligation,”51 becomes part of the federal common law52 if it 
becomes part of U.S. law at all.53 
 
Erie on the law of nations); see generally Curtis A. Bradley, The Status of Customary International 
Law in U.S. Courts - Before and After Erie, 26 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 807, 810 (1998) 
(analyzing the effect of the Erie decision on the use of customary international law by federal 
courts); Hoffman & Zaheer, supra note 48, at 55-59 (offering a discussion of Erie’s impact on 
customary international law’s place in U.S. courts).  But see Gerald L. Neuman, Sense and 
Nonsense About Customary International Law: A Response to Professors Bradley and Goldsmith, 
66 FORDHAM L. REV. 371, 374-76 (1997) (refuting Bradley and Goldsmith’s contention that 
customary international law is embodied in federal common law and therefore destroyed with the 
Erie decision).  “The Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized disputes implicating foreign 
relations as one of the areas where the creation of federal common law is justified by an overriding 
federal interest.”  Id. at 377. 
 50. See infra notes 90-136 and accompanying text for the Supreme Court’s debate on the 
modern law of nations; see infra section IV for the author’s analysis of the inclusion of customary 
international law in the reach of the ATS. 
 51. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES §102 (1987).  
See generally William J. Aceves, The Legality of Transborder Abductions: A Study of United States 
v. Alvarez-Machain, 3 SW. J. L. & TRADE AM. 101, 138 (1996) (identifying the sources of 
customary international law as “numerous and includ[ing]: state practice; international legal 
decisions; treaties and other international legal instruments; the practice of international 
organizations; national legislation and national legal decisions”). 
 52. C.f. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900) (holding “[i]nternational law is part of 
our law, and must be ascertained and administered by the courts of justice of appropriate 
jurisdiction, as often as questions of right depending upon it are duly presented for their 
determination”); see also Donald J. Kochan, The Political Economy of the Production of Customary 
International Law: The Role of Non-Governmental Organizations in U.S. Courts, 22 BERKELEY J. 
INT’L L. 240, 250 (2004) (recognizing The Paquete Habana case as the controlling authority 
allowing international law to be applied in U.S. courts even when the international law has not been 
ratified as a treaty or similarly given status as a federal law). 
 53. See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 32, at 358 (supporting the view that customary 
international law should not be treated as substantive federal law). But see T. Alexander Aleinikoff, 
International Law, Sovereignty, and American Constitutionalism: Reflections on the Customary 
International Law Debate, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 91, 91 (2004) (arguing a novel viewpoint that 
customary international law “has always – and properly – been viewed as . . . neither federal nor 
state law but, rather, law to be applied in appropriate cases by federal courts in instances where they 
otherwise possess jurisdiction.”). 
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D.  Filartiga v. Pena-Irala54 Resurrects the Alien Tort Statute55 
In 1980, the Second Circuit revived the ATS both as a jurisdictional 
basis and as creating a cause of action for a violation of the law of 
nations.56  The Filartiga decision gave life to the ATS in a way that 
many argue the Framers never intended.57  It was clear that the statute 
gave the federal courts jurisdiction over alien tort claims,58 but up to this 
point it was unclear whether the statute also had an embedded cause of 
action.59  Filartiga and the line of cases that followed it60 argued that 
 
 54. 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).  In 1976, Americo Noberto Pena-Irala (Pena), the Inspector 
General of the Police in Asuncion, Paraguay, allegedly kidnapped, tortured and killed a Paraguayan 
youth, Joelito Filartiga, and displayed his corpse to his sister.  Id. at 878.  The Filartiga family was a 
pronounced opponent of the presidency of Alfredo Stroessner, who had controlled Paraguay since 
1954.  Id.  While criminal actions were proceeding slowly in Paraguay, happenstance brought both 
the alleged offender, Pena, and the sister of the victim, Dolly Filartiga, to reside in the United 
States.  Id. Dolly settled in Washington, D.C., and had applied for permanent political asylum after 
entering the United States on a visitor’s visas in 1978.  Id. Pena and his companion also entered the 
United States on visitor’s visas in 1978 and moved to Brooklyn, New York. Id. After learning that 
Pena had entered the United States, Dolly notified Immigration and Naturalization Service (who 
subsequently arrested Pena and ordered his deportation) and commenced an action in the Eastern 
District of New York for the wrongful death of her brother.  Id. at 879. 
 55. Gary Clyde Hufbauer and Nicholas K. Mitrokostas use more colorful language to refer to 
the ATS in the title of their work, Awakening Monster: The Alien Tort Statute of 1789, supra note 7.  
The economic impact that certain interpretations of the ATS – when it is invoked to sue 
multinational corporations – may warrant such a moniker for the ATS.  Id. at 1.  See infra notes 
183-89 and accompanying text (analyzing the consequences of liberal ATS litigation for 
multinational corporations). 
 56. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 890.  The Second Circuit determined both that torture violated 
customary international law and that the law of nations of the ATS included this customary law.  Id. 
at 883.  Regarding torture, the court declared they “have little difficulty discerning its universal 
renunciation in the modern usage and practice of nations.”  Id.  The court proceeded to incorporate 
this customary international law into the “law of nations” language of the ATS. Id. at 884.  “Having 
examined the sources from which customary international law is derived [–] the usage of nations, 
judicial opinions and the works of jurists [–] we conclude that official torture is now prohibited by 
the law of nations.”  Id.  The court thus reversed the lower court’s finding that the federal courts had 
no jurisdiction over the aliens’ claim.  Id. at 890. 
 57. HUFBAUER & MITROKOSTAS, AWAKENING MONSTER, supra note 7, at 4.  The Second 
Circuit lent an interpretation to the ATS that updated the language from “law of nations” to 
“international law.” See id. at 3-4. 
 58. See supra note 24 (reciting the original language of the ATS and its modern counterpart).  
But see Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 885-87 (undertaking an analysis of whether Article III of the U.S. 
Constitution makes the First Congress’ authorization of jurisdiction over alien tort claims 
unconstitutional, and concluding that the ATS was an appropriate exercise of Congress’ ability to 
legislate the jurisdiction of federal courts). 
 59. Stephens, supra note 26, at 186.  One school of thought is that the Framers understood the 
ATS to authorize a cause of action without requiring further legislation by Congress.  Id.  See also 
supra notes 39-43 (discussing the lack of attention given to the ATS by Congress and the courts and 
the corresponding lack of analysis of the cause of action issue); supra note 25 (discussing the lack 
of legislative history surrounding the ATS and reliance on contemporaneous events to determine the 
meaning of the ATS). 
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unless the ATS intended to authorize a cause of action for the law of 
nations, this clause of the Judiciary Act would have been pointless and 
powerless.61  The Filartiga decision resolved that the law of nations as 
contemplated during the United States’ formative years would translate 
to the human rights violations of today.62  “This is undeniably an action 
by an alien, for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of 
nations.”63  Filartiga established a precedent in federal courts that “the 
ATS . . . enables foreigners to sue in U.S. courts for all torts committed 
in violation of international law, as international law may be 
contemporaneously interpreted.”64  Following the Filartiga decision, 
“ATS litigation has proliferated in federal courts, embroiling U.S. courts 
in a broad array of international controversies and incidents ranging 
from alleged war crimes to terrorist attacks to environmental abuses.”65  
 
 60. A representative sampling of the federal court cases which followed the reasoning of 
Filartiga finding in favor of ATS jurisdiction includes: Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 236 (2d Cir. 
1995) (holding that the federal court had jurisdiction over claims of the alien plaintiffs against the 
defendant-Bosnian-Serb self-proclaimed leader “for genocide, war crimes, and crimes against 
humanity in his private capacity”), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1005 (1996), aff’d sub nom. Doe v. 
Karadzic, No. 93 Civ. 1163 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 3, 1997); De Blake v. Republic of Arg., 965 F.2d 699, 
723 (9th Cir. 1992) (allowing aliens’ ATS claim for “anti-Semitic, government-sponsored tyranny” 
and torture to go forward by virtue of a waiver of sovereign immunity), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1017 
(1993); Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 672 F. Supp. 1531 (N.D. Cal. 1987) (holding that two Argentinians’ 
claims of torture, murder and prolonged arbitrary detention against an Argentinian general 
amounted to a cause of action under the ATS); Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162 (D. Mass. 
1995) (holding Guatemalan citizens’ allegations of torture, arbitrary detentions, summary 
executions, and disappearances were sufficient to sustain jurisdiction under the ATS); Abebe-Jira v. 
Negewo, 72 F.3d 844 (11th Cir. 1996) (holding that the claims of “torture and cruel, inhuman, and 
degrading treatment” of Ethiopian citizens against officials in the controlling dictatorship of 
Ethiopia were actionable under the ATS), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 830 (1996); Jama v. U.S. I.N.S., 22 
F. Supp. 2d 353 (D.N.J. 1998) (holding that the poor and inhuman treatment given to alien asylum-
seekers was actionable under the ATS). See also generally Donaldson, supra note 23 (“collect[ing] 
and analyz[ing] the federal court cases which have construed or applied [the ATS] since its 
enactment.”). 
 61. Stephens, supra note 26, at 187-88.  An interpretation of the ATS that requires additional 
legislation for the individual claim of an alien, Stephens argues, is “ahistorical” because it would 
mean “that Congress intended that the [ATS] create a category of jurisdiction that would remain 
empty until filled with legislatively enacted claims.”  Id. at 187. 
 62. HUFBAUER & MITROKOSTAS, AWAKENING MONSTER supra note 7, at 3-4.  “The core 
holding of Filartiga has been followed by courts around the country: an alien may sue for violations 
of ‘universal, definable and obligatory’ international law norms.” Stephens, supra note 26, at 174. 
 63. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 887.  In the time between the Filartiga decision and the Supreme 
Court’s ruling in Sosa, there has been “a near-unanimous consensus among federal courts” requiring 
that an alien’s tort claim “involve[ ] a violation of the ‘law of nations,’” which is referred to as 
customary international law in modern terms.  Hoffman & Zaheer, supra note 48, at 50. 
 64. HUFBAUER & MITROKOSTAS, AWAKENING MONSTER, supra note 7, at 4 (emphasis in 
original). 
 65. Gregory G. Garre, Coded Message, THE RECORDER, September 17, 2004, at 4 (explaining 
that Filartiga retrieved the ATS from “historical obscurity” and spawned numerous other ATS 
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It would not be until Sosa that any discussion by the Supreme Court 
addressed this interpretation of the statute by the federal courts.66 
III.  STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A.  Statement of the Facts 
In 1990, a federal grand jury indicted Humberto Alvarez-Machain 
(Alvarez), a Mexican physician, for the murder of Enrique Camarena-
Salazar, an agent of the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA).67  The 
United States District Court for the Central District of California issued 
a warrant for Alvarez’s arrest following the grand jury’s indictment, and 
the DEA sought the Mexican government’s help in bringing him to the 
United States.68  Because the Mexican government was either unwilling 
or unable to comply with the DEA’s request for Alvarez’s delivery, the 
DEA hired Mexican nationals to kidnap Alvarez and bring him to the 
United States where the DEA would have authority to arrest and try 
Alvarez.69  Among those the DEA engaged to seize Alvarez was the 
petitioner, Jose Francisco Sosa.70  In a DEA-approved action, Mexican 
nationals “abducted Alvarez from his house, held him overnight in a 
motel, and brought him by private plane to El Paso, Texas, where he was 
arrested by federal officers.”71 
After being acquitted of his criminal charges by the District Court 
in 1993,72 Alvarez returned to Mexico and commenced a civil action in 
the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California for damages 
 
claims in the federal courts over the next twenty years).  See also supra note 60 (detailing decisions 
following Filartiga). 
 66. Garre, supra note 65, at 4.  The Sosa case “signals a new era in the Rip van Winkle life of 
the ATS.” Id. 
 67. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 697 (2004).  Alvarez had allegedly been involved in Camarena-
Salazar’s 1985 torture and death in Guadalajara Mexico.  Id. (citing United States v. Alvarez-
Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 657 (1992)).  The Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) gathered eyewitness 
testimony which led officials to believe that Alvarez was present at the place where Camarena-
Salazar was killed, and that Alvarez had “acted to prolong the agent’s life in order to extend the 
interrogation and torture.” Id. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. at 698. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. Citing the outrageous nature of his arrest, Sosa moved to dismiss his indictment with a 
claim that the method of his arrest violated the extradition treaty between the United States and 
Mexico.  Id. The District Court dismissed the criminal case, which the Ninth Circuit upheld.  Id. 
The Supreme Court reversed and remanded.  Id. In 1992, Alvarez was acquitted.  Id. 
13
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suffered during his alleged false arrest.73  Alvarez asserted a claim for 
damages against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act 
(FTCA),74 and a claim against Sosa for a violation of the law of nations, 
invoking the Alien Tort Statute.75  The FTCA allows a suit against the 
Government for the negligent or wrongful acts or omissions of its 
employees.76  As an alien, Alvarez argued for both jurisdiction and a 
cause of action under the ATS for his claim against Sosa, also a Mexican 
national, alleging the nature of his arrest was a violation of the law of 
nations.77 
B.  Procedural History 
Holding that Alvarez’s apprehension in Mexico, including the state 
sponsored transborder abduction and the arbitrary detention, violated 
customary international law, the district court entered summary 
judgment against Sosa under the ATS.78  Both Alvarez and Sosa 
appealed to the Ninth Circuit.79  First, a three-judge panel, and then the 
court sitting en banc affirmed the judgment and damages awarded on the 
 
 73. Id.  Alvarez named the following defendants in this suit: Sosa, Antonio Garate-Bustament 
(both a DEA agent and a Mexican national), five unnamed Mexican nationals, the United States, 
and four DEA agents.  Id. 
 74. Id.  The relevant portion of the FTCA provides: 
[T]he district courts . . . shall have exclusive jurisdiction of civil actions on claims 
against the United States, for money damages, accruing on and after January 1, 1945, for 
injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death caused by the negligent or 
wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government while acting within the 
scope of his office or employment, under circumstances where the United States, if a 
private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place 
where the act or omission occurred. 
 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1) (2000). 
 75. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 698.  See 28 U.S.C. §1350 (2000); supra notes 24-66 and accompanying 
text (detailing the specific language of the ATS and its evolution over the 200-plus years of its 
existence). 
 76. See supra note 73 (detailing the liability of the Federal Government under the FTCA).  
There are numerous instances in which the government is exempt from such liability. See infra 
notes 87-88 (discussing the exceptions relevant to the Government’s liability in this case). 
 77. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 698; see also supra notes 24-66 for the text of the ATS and a discussion 
of the evolution of this statute. 
 78. Alvarez-Machain v. United States, 331 F.3d 604, 610-11 (9th Cir. 2003), rev’d, 542 U.S. 
692 (2004).  The district court limited Alvarez’s recovery to only the damages he suffered while 
detained in Mexico. Id. at 611.  Alvarez’s award totaled $25,000, calculated by federal common law 
as opposed to Mexican law. Id. 
 79. Id.  Sosa argued that Alvarez should not have been permitted a cause of action under the 
ATS, and that the district court erred in not applying Mexican law for the award of damages. Id.  
Alvarez appealed two issues irrelevant to Supreme Court’s decision: 1) the United States should not 
have replaced the DEA agents against whom he also had ATS claims, and 2) his damages should 
not have been limited to his Mexican arrest. Id. 
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ATS claims.80  Under Ninth Circuit precedent,81 the court held that 
Alvarez had a cause of action under the ATS.82  The Ninth Circuit 
interpreted the ATS as not only establishing jurisdiction in federal courts 
for the tort claims of aliens, but also establishing “a cause of action for 
an alleged violation of the law of nations.”83  The Ninth Circuit further 
applied the requirement that the law of nations  be “specific, universal, 
and obligatory” in nature broadly enough to encompass Alvarez’s 
arbitrary arrest and detention claims.84  The United States and Sosa 
appealed the Ninth Circuit’s decision, arguing that the ATS does nothing 
more than establish jurisdiction in the federal courts.85 
The district court, on the government’s motion, dismissed Alvarez’s 
FTCA claims.86  After a series of appeals and remands,87 the Ninth 
Circuit ultimately reversed the dismissal of the FTCA claims.88  The 
 
 80. Id. at 611. 
 81. See Trajano v. Marcos, 978 F.2d 493, 499 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that “acts of official 
torture violate customary international law,” and concluding that the plaintiff, an alien, had 
“properly invoke[d] the subject-matter jurisdiction of the federal courts under the [ATS]” in a 
wrongful death action against Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos and his daughter for the 
torture and murder of a Philippine citizen); Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 25 F.3d 1467 (9th Cir. 1994) 
(holding that the ATS not only establishes jurisdiction in the federal courts, but also creates a cause 
of action for the violation of the law of nations). 
 82. Alvarez-Machain, 331 F.3d at 612. 
 83. Id.  See also infra notes 150-165 and accompanying text (discussing the discretion federal 
courts use to determine these causes of action). 
 84. Alvarez-Machain, 331 F.3d at 619.  The Ninth Circuit comments that the “specific, 
universal, and obligatory” test for law of nations violations is necessary to limit judicial review of 
international law to only those “that have achieved sufficient consensus to merit application by a 
domestic tribunal.” Id. at 612. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 428 (1964), 
superseded by The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, § 620(e)(2), 22 U.S.C.A. § 2370(e)(2).  While 
arbitrary arrest and detention meet this threshold, Alvarez’s claim of transborder abduction does not 
rise to this level according to the Ninth Circuit.  Alvarez-Machain, 331 F.3d at 620; see also infra 
notes 137-149 (discussing the standard proposed by the Supreme Court for the determination of 
international law use in federal courts). 
 85. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 699 (2004). 
 86. Id. 
 87. Alvarez’s FTCA claims had a tumultuous journey through the district and circuit courts.  
Alvarez’s initial complaint was comprised of both conventional (kidnapping, torture, cruel, inhuman 
and degrading treatment or punishment, arbitrary detention, assault and battery, false imprisonment, 
intentional infliction of emotional distress, false arrest, negligent employment, and negligent 
infliction of emotional distress) and constitutional torts (under the Fourth, Fifth and Eight 
Amendments for kidnapping, torture, cruel and inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment, 
denial of adequate medical treatment, and arbitrary detention).  Alvarez-Machain, 331 F.3d at 610.  
All of the DEA agents were replaced by the United States as defendant as to the conventional tort 
claims.  Id.  The District Court denied the United States’ defense that the FTCA claims were time-
barred, which the Ninth Circuit affirmed.  Id.  On remand, the United States was granted summary 
judgment on all of the FTCA claims.  Id. at 611.  On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed the dismissal 
of the FTCA claims.  Id. 
 88. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 699.  28 U.S.C. § 2680(k) restores sovereign immunity where the 
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government included an appeal of the FTCA ruling with its request for 
review of the ATS interpretation.89 
C.  Supreme Court’s Decision 
1.  Plurality 
The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit.90  The Court 
overturned the finding of government liability under the FTCA for the 
arrest of Alvarez-Machain in Mexico, holding that “the foreign country 
exception [of the FTCA] bars all claims based on any injury suffered in 
a foreign country, regardless of where the tortious act or omission 
occurred.”91 
 
Government would otherwise be liable under § 1346(b), for those claims “arising in a foreign 
country.”  28 U.S.C. §2680(k) (2000).  The court held that despite the language of the statute, the 
Government was still liable under the “headquarters doctrine,” which allows a claim to proceed “if 
harm occurring in a foreign country was proximately caused by acts in the United States.”  Alvarez-
Machain, 331 F.3d at 638.  According to the Circuit Court, the “quintessential headquarters claim” 
is one in which government employees, from the locale of their U.S. offices, “guide and supervise 
actions in other countries.” Id.  Because the DEA, from its office in Los Angeles, had coordinated 
the removal of Alvarez, giving “precise instructions” regarding who should be involved and how 
Alvarez should be handled, the court maintained the United States liability, stating that “Alvarez’s 
abduction fits the headquarters doctrine like a glove.”  Id. 
 89. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 699.  The Ninth Circuit had also explored a possible exception under the 
FTCA for intentional torts, as provided in 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h).  Alvarez-Machain, 331 F.3d at 639.  
The Ninth Circuit agreed with the district court that Alvarez’s claim was not excluded by the 
intentional torts exception because the DEA agents are law enforcement officers within the scope of 
the FTCA.  Id.  The government did not appeal on this basis and the Supreme Court does not 
address it in its opinion.  Sosa, 542 U.S. at 699.  The Government also appealed the FTCA claim on 
the basis that the arrest was not tortious.  Id.  The Government argued that 21 U.S.C. § 878 grants 
arrest authority to the DEA.  Id. The Supreme Court did not decide the FTCA issue on that ground.  
Id. 
 90. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 738.  Justice Souter delivered the opinion of the court.  Id. at 697.  
Justice Scalia (joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas) filed a separate concurring 
opinion as to the issue of the ATS.  Id. at 739.  Justice Ginsburg filed a separate concurring opinion 
as to FTCA element of the decision (joined by Justice Breyer). Id. at 751.  Justice Breyer filed his 
own concurring opinion. Id. at 760. 
 91. Id. at 712.  The full extent of the Supreme Court’s decision regarding the FTCA claim 
will not be discussed in this Note, as the author’s focus is on Alvarez’s claims under the ATS.  
However, a brief consideration of the Court’s holding will be helpful as it is likely the Government 
will use the shield of the FTCA foreign country exception in the eventuality that a claim is 
permitted under the ATS and the United States is named as a defendant.  See David C. Baluarte, 
Comment, Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain: Upholding the Alien Tort Claims Act While Affirming 
American Exceptionalism, 12 HUM. RTS. BRIEF 11, 13 (2004) (noting that the FTCA will protect the 
United States government from exposure to liability under the ATS).   
  The Court refused to apply the headquarters doctrine to this case, lest it “swallow the 
foreign country exception whole.”  Sosa, 542 U.S. at 703.  Employing a test of proximate causation, 
the Court examined the actions of the DEA agents in the United States, and determined that even if 
16
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The circuit court’s ATS holding – recognizing transborder arrest as 
a violation of the law of nations and an actionable tort under the ATS – 
led the Supreme Court to delve into the obscure background of the 
ATS.92  Using the available historical framework of the ATS, the 
plurality arrived at two conclusions concerning Congress’s original 
intentions for the ATS.93  Justice Souter reasoned that history supports 
the proposition that the ATS was intended to be a functional statute, 
which in turn meant the ATS must include some latent cause of action, 
in addition to the jurisdictional grant.94 
[T]here is every reason to suppose that the First Congress did not pass 
the ATS as a jurisdictional convenience to be placed on the shelf for 
use by a future Congress or state legislature that might, some day, 
authorize the creation of causes of action or itself decide to make some 
element of the law of nations actionable for the benefit of foreigners.95 
Beyond the jurisdictional provisions of the ATS, the Court 
concluded that history implies “that Congress intended the ATS to 
furnish jurisdiction for a relatively modest set of actions alleging 
 
the plans made in Los Angeles and Washington were a proximate cause of Alvarez’s injuries, they 
did not subsume the proximate causation of the action that occurred in Mexico.  Id. at 703-04.  The 
Court also focused on the “arising in” language of 28 U.S.C. § 2680 (k) to mean an exclusion of all 
claims for injuries which occur in a foreign country. Id. at 704-05.  Most importantly, the Court 
cautioned that the foreign country exception was in place to protect the United States against claims 
where the substantive law of foreign countries must apply, and the headquarters doctrine would 
undo this safeguard.  Id. at 705-06.   
  Justice Ginsburg filed a concurring opinion (joined by Justice Breyer) with regard to the 
FTCA claim.  Id. at 751 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).  In Justice Ginsburg’s view, the “arising in” 
language of the foreign country exception does not point to the place where the harm occurred, but 
to the place of the act or omission.  Id. at 760.  The “last significant act or omission rule” determines 
where the claim “arises.” Id.  With this in mind, Justice Ginsburg found the Government to be free 
from liability, because the actions in Mexico were the last significant act causing Alvarez’s harm.  
Id. 
 92. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 712-13.  To begin his discussion of the ATS and its applicability to the 
Sosa case, Justice Souter employed the literary moniker given to the ATS by Judge Friendly to 
remark that few indicators of the original framers’ intent accompany the “legal Lohengrin.”  Id. at 
718-19.  The Court entered this murky area of the law aware of this fact: “despite considerable 
scholarly attention, it is fair to say that a consensus understanding of what Congress intended has 
proven elusive.”  Id.; see supra note 25 (discussing the legislative obscurity of the ATS). 
 93. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 719.  The Court examined many of the same historic texts and scholarly 
analyses of the First Congressional era that are examined supra, notes 23-38. 
 94. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 719. 
 95. Id.  Justice Souter cites the “anxieties of the preconstitutional period,” see supra notes 25-
38 and accompanying text (sketching the same historical atmosphere which Justice Souter relies on 
here), as evidence that the statute was meant to have “practical effect.” Sosa, 542 U.S. at 719. 
“There is too much historical record to believe that Congress would have enacted the ATS only to 
leave it lying fallow indefinitely.”  Id. 
17
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violations of the law of nations.”96  It is these inferred causes of action 
that gave the ATS its limited practical effect.97  “The jurisdictional grant 
is best read as having been enacted on the understanding that the 
common law would provide a cause of action for the modest number of 
international law violations with a potential for personal liability at the 
time.”98 
The Court, however, could not infer from the ATS’s history that the 
concept of the law of nations was meant to be an expanding one.99  
Justice Souter “found no basis to suspect that Congress had any 
examples in mind beyond those corresponding to Blackstone’s three 
primary offenses: violation of safe conducts, infringement of the rights 
of ambassadors, and piracy.”100  The plurality reasoned that the Court 
must be cautious in allowing alien tort claims to fall within the “law of 
nations” umbrella of the ATS.101  They declined to accept the 
interpretation advanced by Alvarez – that the ATS was not only 
jurisdictional, but also a cause of action for wide-sweeping violations of 
modern international law – deeming such an interpretation 
“implausible.”102  However, they also declined to adopt the interpretation 
that Sosa proposed.103  Sosa’s view – that “there could be no relief 
 
 96. Id. at 720.  The Continental Congress’ grappling with its inability to punish infractions of 
the law of nations is the basis for Justice Souter’s inference that at least some meager meat was 
stuck to the bones of the ATS.  Id. at 716 (citing J. Madison, JOURNAL OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL 
CONVENTION 60 (E. Scott ed. 1893)).  See supra notes 26-32 and accompanying text for discussion 
of the Continental Congress’ early attempts to enforce the law of nations. 
 97. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 724.  “[T]he reasonable inference from the historical materials is that the 
statute was intended to have practical effect the moment it became law.”  Id. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. at 725.  “[S]ome, but few, torts in violation of the law of nations were understood to be 
within the common law.” Id. at 720. 
 100. Id. at 724.  The First Congress’ intention likely was shaped by Blackstone’s theory of the 
law of nations. Id.  See supra notes 33-38 for a discussion of Blackstone’s influence on the 
Founding Fathers. 
 101. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 725.  Justice Souter outlined five reasons for the Court’s caution: 1) the 
changed concept of common law since 1789; 2) the “rethinking of the role of the federal courts in 
making [common law]” (citing the Court’s decision in Erie R. Co.  v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 65 (1938) 
(denying the existence of federal common law), see supra notes 46-53 and accompanying text for a 
discussion of Erie’s impact on the ATS; 3) the Court’s insistence that private rights of action are 
better created by the legislature; 4) the potential impact on the foreign relations of the United States; 
and 5) the lack of a congressional mandate to “seek out and define new and debatable violations of 
the law of nations.” Id. at 725-28.  See also infra note 198 (arguing that Justice Souter’s five 
concerns should be an incentive for Congress to legislate the ATS claims that can be actionable in 
U.S. courts). 
 102. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 713.  When the ATS authorized “cognizance” over the law of nations to 
the district courts, “the term bespoke a grant of jurisdiction, not power to mold substantive law.”  Id. 
 103. Id.  “[H]istory and practice give the edge” to the position that “because torts in violation 
of the law of nations would have been recognized within the common law of the time,” the ATS 
18
Akron Law Review, Vol. 39 [2006], Iss. 2, Art. 7
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol39/iss2/7
DAMORE1.DOC 4/14/2006  1:15:04 PM 
2006] SOSA V. ALVAREZ-MACHAIN 611 
without a further statute expressly authorizing adoption of causes of 
action” – would, in the Court’s opinion, render the ATS “stillborn.”104  
The Court settled that “the statute was intended as jurisdictional in the 
sense of addressing the power of the courts to entertain cases concerned 
within a certain subject.”105 
The conclusion that a confined set of causes of action accompanied 
the ATS would direct the court to analyze those cases that have the good 
fortune of being actionable under the ATS.106  The Court began by 
examining the law of nations at the time of enactment of the ATS,107 and 
then referenced an historical text which treated the law of nations as 
“general norms governing the behavior of national states with each 
other.”108  Despite strong authority tending to limit the law of nations to 
application between states, the Supreme Court adopted Blackstone’s 
teachings and recognized limited situations in which the law of nations 
protects individual rights.109  The Court determined that the intent of the 
Judiciary Act was that the ATS’s jurisdictional strength be supplemented 
by causes of action which could arise under the common law.110  
According to the Court’s interpretation of the ATS, the common law 
 
was not a moot statute because of the lack of additional legislation to attach causes of action.  Id. 
 104. Id. at 714.  “[T]here is every reason to suppose that the First Congress did not pass the 
ATS as a jurisdictional convenience to be placed on the shelf.”  Id. at 719.  The Court found “it 
would have been passing strange” to hold that “Congress would have enacted the ATS only to leave 
it lying fallow indefinitely.”  Id.  Instead the Court summons what is available in the historical 
record to breathe life to the drafters’ intentions.  Id. at 720.  See infra notes 119-20 and 
accompanying text (citing the Supreme Court’s insistence that the ATS was meant to have a 
functional value immediately following its passage, thus requiring an interpretation that some 
causes of action were contained within the law of nations concept). 
 105. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 714.  These cases were limited to a “modest set of actions alleging 
violations of the law of nations.”  Id. at 720. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id.  For example, Blackstone formed a broad basis for this understanding.  Id.  See supra 
notes 33-38 and accompanying text for the impact of Blackstone’s writings on the drafters. 
 108. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 714.  The law of nations was “‘the science which teaches the rights 
subsisting between nations or states, and the obligations correspondent to those nations.’” Id. 
(quoting E. DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS, PRELIMINARIES § 3 (J. Chitty et al. trans. ed. 
1883)). 
 109. Id. at 720.  Traditionally the offenses encompassed in the law of nations were only those 
that affected “‘whole states or nations’ and not individuals seeking relief in courts.”  Id. The Court 
looked again to Blackstone to identify this class of potential plaintiffs under a law of nations claim 
and to exclude individuals from the traditional understanding. Id. However, the Court did not 
unilaterally preclude an individual’s use of the ATS and law of nations claims.  Id. 
 110. Id. at 724.  The “reasonable inference” was that the framers were relying on the common 
law to provide a cause of action “for the modest number of international law violations with a 
potential for personal liability at the time.” Id.  The Court reaches this conclusion because of its 
belief that “the statute was intended to have practical effect the moment it became law.”  Id. 
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also encompassed claims of individual aliens.111  The Court could point 
to no occurrence in the two centuries since the enactment of the ATS 
that “categorically precluded the federal courts from recognizing a claim 
under the law of nations as an element of common law.”112  To limit the 
scope of the claims that could be brought under the jurisdiction of the 
ATS, the Court relied on the “present-day law of nations,” and adopted a 
standard that required the claims to “rest on a norm of international 
character accepted by the civilized world and defined with a specificity 
comparable to the features of the 18th-century paradigms we have 
recognized.”113 
The Court declined to completely cease “judicial recognition of 
actionable international norms;”114 instead, “the door is still ajar subject 
to vigilant doorkeeping, and thus open to a narrow class of international 
norms today.”115  Relying on the precedent of The Paquete Habana116 
and rejecting complete occlusion by Erie,117 the plurality recognized that 
certain claims could meet their standard.118  The Court preserved an 
 
 111. Id.  The Court reaches this conclusion despite the absence of a “basis to suspect” that 
Congress had any specific claims in mind beyond those which would have been comprehended 
from Blackstone’s teachings: “violation of safe conducts, infringements of the rights of 
ambassadors, and piracy.”  Id.  See supra notes 33-38 and accompanying text for the background of 
Blackstone’s influence on the Framers. 
 112. Sosa, 542 U.S. 724-25.  Justice Scalia argued that the plurality misunderstood Erie’s 
effect on the existence of a general federal common law.  Id. at 744-45 (Scalia, J., concurring).  See 
infra notes 127-36 and accompanying text for Justice Scalia’s position.  See also supra notes 44-53 
for background of the Erie decision and its effect on the general common law. 
 113. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 725.  See infra notes 141-49 and accompanying text (analyzing the 
application of this “international character” standard in federal courts). 
 114. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 729. 
 115. Id.  See infra note 118 (addressing some of the international norms which the Court 
accepted as actionable under the ATS). 
 116. 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900) (holding that “[i]nternational law is part of our law and must be 
ascertained and administered by the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction, as often as 
questions of right depending upon it are duly presented for their determination”).  See supra note 52 
(discussing The Paquete Habana precedent permitting international law in U.S. courts). 
 117. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 729 (“Erie did not in terms bar any judicial recognition of new 
substantive rules, no matter what the circumstances, and post-Erie understanding has identified 
limited enclaves in which federal courts may derive some substantive law in a common law way.”).  
The common law, according to the Court, is not “a discoverable reflection of universal reason.”  Id.  
The Court instead described common law in a “positivistic way, as a product of human choice.”  Id. 
 118. Id. at 730-31.  The Court accepts that some modern violations fit within the historic 
concept of the law of nations, such as in Filartiga, in which the district court drew a parallel 
between torturers and pirates, to couch a cause of action for torture into the ATS-enactment era law 
of nations.  Id. at 732.  “‘[F]or the purposes of civil liability, the torturer has become – like the 
pirate and the slave trader before him – hostis humani generic, an enemy of all mankind.’” Id. 
(quoting Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 890 (2d Cir. 1980)).  The Tel-Oren court, which 
rejected ATS jurisdiction for the claim before the court, see supra note 43 (briefly reciting the 
court’s holding in this case), also espoused a limitation on the ATS agreeable to the Sosa court.  Id.  
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opportunity for the federal courts to apply international law via the 
common law; to decide otherwise, even given the decision in Erie, 
“would take some explaining to say now that the federal courts must 
avert their gaze entirely from any international norm intended to protect 
individuals.”119  Justice Souter argued that it was preposterous to think 
the Framers would have anticipated the death of the common law or that 
they would have allowed this modern shift to incapacitate the federal 
courts when it came to upholding international law.120 
The Court, therefore, looked to “historical antecedents” to 
determine if Alvarez’s claim might pass through the door.121 The Court 
determined that Alvarez’s claim for arbitrary arrest and detention did not 
violate any norm of international law, such that it could support a cause 
of action under the ATS.122  “We do not believe . . . that the limited, 
implicit sanction to entertain the handful of international cum common 
law claims understood in 1789 should be taken as authority to recognize 
 
That court suggested “the ‘limits of [the ATS]’s reach’ be defined by ‘a handful of heinous actions – 
each of which violates definable, universal and obligatory norms.’”  Id. (quoting Tel-Oren v. Libyan 
Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 781 (U.S. App. D.C. 1984) (Edwards, J., concurring), cert. denied, 
470 U.S. 1003 (1985)). 
 119. Id. at 730.  “[O]ur holding today is consistent with the division of responsibilities between 
federal and state courts after Erie.”  Id. at 731 n.19. 
 120. Id. at 730.  Justice Souter wrote, “We think it would be unreasonable to assume that the 
First Congress would have expected federal courts to lose all capacity to recognize enforceable 
international norms simply because the common law might lose some metaphysical cachet on the 
road to modern realism.”  Id. 
 121. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 732.  The Court quotes The Paquete Habana decision at length because 
it fully articulates the authority on which the courts can cull customary international law for 
application in their own courts.  Id.at 733-34. The Paquete Habana instructs: 
[W]here there is no treaty, and no controlling executive or legislative act or judicial 
decision, resort must be had to the customs and usages of civilized nations; and as 
evidence of these, to the works of jurists and commentators, who by years of labor, 
research and experience, have made themselves peculiarly well acquainted with the 
subjects of which they treat.  Such works are resorted to by judicial tribunals, not for the 
speculations of their authors concerning what the law ought to be, but for trustworthy 
evidence of what the law really is. 
Id. at 734 (quoting The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900)). 
 122. Id. at 738.  The Court rejected Alvarez’s arguments that arbitrary arrest and detention is in 
fact a violation of an international law norm. Id. at 735-38.  Alvarez cited the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which the Court held 
did not “create obligations enforceable in federal courts” and which could not be used by Alvarez to 
establish an applicable rule of international law. Id. at 735.  The Court also rejected Alvarez’s 
argument that arbitrary detention is generally prohibited; the Court reasoned that if such an 
argument were accepted, “[h]is rule would support a cause of action in federal court for any arrest, 
anywhere in the world, unauthorized by the law of the jurisdiction in which it took place, and would 
create a cause of action for any seizure of any alien in violation of the Fourth Amendment.”  Id. at 
736. 
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the right of action asserted by Alvarez here.”123 
The standard adopted by the Court – based on “historical 
antecedents” – leaves a certain amount of discretion to the lower 
courts.124  The Court conditioned this discretion on an awareness of the 
ramifications of recognizing actionable violations of international law.125  
“[T]he determination whether a norm is sufficiently definite to support a 
cause of action should (and, indeed, inevitably must) involve an element 
of judgment about the practical consequences of making that cause 
available to litigants in the federal courts.”126 
2.  Justice Scalia’s Concurring Opinion 
Justice Scalia, joined by former Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice 
Thomas, filed a concurring opinion to stress his opposition to the 
plurality’s “reservation of a discretionary power in the Federal Judiciary 
to create causes of action for the enforcement of international-law-based 
norms.”127  Justice Scalia agreed with the plurality’s ATS analysis with 
respect to its determination that the statute is jurisdictional only and that 
the ATS at most authorizes causes of actions under the law of nations 
purely as understood by the 1789 drafters.128  Justice Scalia departed 
from the plurality, however, in insisting the Court find a case or statute 
that “authorizes that peculiar exception from Erie’s fundamental holding 
 
 123. Id. at 712.  Alvarez attempted to bolster his argument that arbitrary arrest and transborder 
abduction amounted to a violation of the law of nations by presenting non-binding United Nations 
covenants as an indicator of the widespread acceptance of these torts as violations of international 
law.  Id. at 734-35.  Despite the evidence produced by Alvarez, the Supreme Court rejected his 
claims.  Id. at 738. 
[A]lthough it is easy to say that some policies of prolonged arbitrary detentions are so 
bad that those who enforce them become enemies of the human race, it may be harder to 
say which policies cross that line with the certainty afforded by Blackstone’s three 
common law offenses.  In any event, the label would never fit the reckless policeman 
who botches his warrant, even though that same officer might pay damages under 
municipal law. 
Id. at 737. 
 124. Id. at 732.  See infra notes 151-165 and accompanying text (analyzing the dangers of the 
discretion left in the hands of the lower courts). 
 125. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 732.  See supra note 101 (briefly outlining the reasons for Justice 
Souter’s warning to be aware of consequences attached to the courts’ discretion); infra note 198 
(providing a more complete recitation of Justice Souter’s reasons and connecting those reasons to 
the foreign policy concerns of the political branches of the United States). 
 126. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 733. 
 127. Id. at 739 (Scalia, J., concurring).  Where Justice Souter allowed the door to remain 
slightly ajar, Justice Scalia insisted it be firmly shut.  Id. at 746. 
 128. Id. at 743.  Justice Scalia insisted this would have been an appropriate stopping point. Id.  
The Court’s agreement that the ATS is jurisdictional only and does not provide for causes of action 
in international law would have been sufficient to decide the present case.  Id. 
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that a general [federal] common law does not exist.”129  Justice Scalia 
would require “law of nations” in the ATS to mean “the accepted 
practices of nations in their dealings with one another” and on the high 
sea.130 
Justice Scalia’s dissatisfaction with Justice Souter’s treatment of the 
ATS is fully embodied in his approach to federal common law and his 
insistence that the door to that body of law cannot be opened because it 
was closed in Erie.131  “Because today’s federal common law is not our 
Framers’ general common law, the question presented by the suggestion 
of discretionary authority to enforce the law of nations is not whether to 
extend old-school general-common-law adjudication.  Rather, it is 
whether to create new federal common law.”132  Justice Scalia rejected 
the plurality’s invitation to the lower courts to “create rights where 
Congress has not authorized them to do so,” especially when the 
plurality has acknowledged that the ATS is jurisdictional only, and that 
this was understood both by the 1789 Congress and its modern 
counterpart.133  Drawing from the precedent already emanating from the 
federal courts, Justice Scalia predicted that the residual discretion left by 
the plurality would have “quite terrified” the 1789 drafters of the 
ATS.134  The “illegitimate lawmaking endeavor” will, in Justice Scalia’s 
opinion, empower the lower courts to be the “principal actors,” with 
only a “tiny fraction of their decisions” being reviewed by the Supreme 
Court.135  This discretion troubled Justice Scalia because the 
democratically created American law “does not recognize a category of 
 
 129. Id. at 744 (emphasis in original).  The plurality, Justice Scalia complained, was instead 
looking for a case or statute that “prevents federal courts from applying the law of nations as part of 
the general common law.” Id. (emphasis in original). 
 130. Id. at 749.  Those common laws would encompass the treatment of ambassadors, 
sovereign immunity, and piracy.  Id.  Justice Scalia noted that these specific law of nations have 
been incorporated into legislation such that these causes of action may survive despite the 
destruction of federal common law. Id. 
 131. Id. at 746.  This is where Justice Scalia disagreed with the plurality’s willingness to keep 
the door ajar.  Id.  In his analysis, the door had already been shut by Erie.  Id. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. at 747.  Justice Scalia feared the consequences of this discretion that allows “judicial 
occupation of a domain that belongs to the people’s representatives.” Id.  “One does not need a 
crystal ball to predict that this occupation will not be long in coming, since the Court endorses the 
reasoning of ‘many of the courts and judges who faced the issues before it reached this Court.’”  Id. 
(quoting the plurality’s opinion at 732). 
 134. Id.  at 749.  Conversely, Justice Scalia is confident that the Framers would have been 
comfortable with his interpretation of the ATS in the post-Erie judicial world.  Id. 
 135. Id. at 750.  If all of the “future conversions of perceived international norms into 
American law would be approved by [the Supreme Court] itself,” Justice Scalia would still be 
troubled by the absence of the democratically elected representatives in the process. Id. 
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activity that is so universally disapproved of by other nations that it is 
automatically unlawful here, and automatically gives rise to a private 
action for money damages in federal courts.”136 
IV.  ANALYSIS 
A.  The Role of Customary International Law in Federal Courts 
The ATS is in great need of a modern make-over.  While Justice 
Souter and the plurality are comfortable with leaving the door open to 
re-examination as other international law claims come before the federal 
courts, Justice Scalia’s closed-door approach is more appropriate until 
Congress affirmatively legislates which international law and human 
rights violations – if any – will be actionable under the ATS.137  The 
current  reality left by Sosa results in three potential courses for the 
federal courts in ATS litigation: (1) following the spirit of the plurality’s 
decision by restricting the claims of aliens to those most closely 
resembling the laws contemplated by the First Congress when it 
included the phrase “law of nations” in the ATS;138 (2) liberally 
employing the discretion granted by the Supreme Court and squeezing 
through the slightly ajar door a multitude of human rights claims 
 
 136. Id. at 751.  Justice Scalia’s basis for abhorring the creation of common law by the federal 
courts was the contradiction it poses to our accepted principle of democratically-chosen law-making 
bodies.  Id.  He summarized this ideal, lamented the encroachment of the courts into legislative 
territory and accused the plurality of endorsing the lawmaking behavior of the lower courts:   
We Americans have a method for making the laws that are over us.  We elect 
representatives to two Houses of Congress, each of which must enact the new law and 
present it for approval of a President, whom we also elect.  For over two decades now, 
unelected federal judges have been usurping this lawmaking power by converting what 
they regard as norms of international law into American law.  Today’s opinion approves 
that process in principle, though urging the lower courts to be more restrained. 
Id. at 750. 
 137. Id. at 730 (rejecting the argument that the ATS did not include causes of action because 
such an interpretation would have rendered the statute non-functioning from its very start). 
 138. This course would, as the Supreme Court ultimately did, reject claims for more novel 
human rights claims like the arbitrary arrest claims of Alvarez-Machain. See, e.g., Sosa, 542 U.S. at 
738.  One commentator, however, argues that the Supreme Court erred in not recognizing 
transborder abductions as a violation of customary international law when Alvarez-Machain’s 
criminal case was before the Court in 1992.  Aceves, supra note 51, at 139.  See also Stephen Fohn, 
Do DEA Field Agents Have the Power to Unilaterally Execute a Trans-Border Abduction?: The 
Ninth Circuit’s Take on Alvarez-Machain v. United States, 27 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 221, 233 (2004) 
(analyzing the circumstances and consequences of Alvarez-Machain’s arrest).  The Ninth Circuit 
did find Alvarez-Machain’s alleged abduction actionable under the ATS by relying on the precedent 
of Martinez v. City of Los Angeles, 141 F.3d 1373, 1384 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding that arbitrary 
arrest and detention was actionable under the ATS).  Id. at 233 n.79. 
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recognized as customary law and read into the broad term “law of 
nations” (in the manner of Filartiga);139  or (3) recognizing the lack of 
common law to supply modern “law of nations” under the ATS, and 
rejecting all claims under the ATS until Congress legislates specific 
causes of action.140 
1.  A Norm of International Character, Specific, and Comparable to 
18th Century Paradigms141 
The Supreme Court preserved some opportunities for future ATS 
claims by deciding Sosa on the basis that the alleged customary 
international law that Alvarez-Machain relied upon did not achieve a 
standard of universal specificity and resemblance to the 1789 version of 
the law of nations.142  The slightly ajar door of the Sosa decision 
implicitly allowed federal courts to determine which claims might be 
included in the jurisdiction of the ATS; the plurality declined to establish 
a body of actionable claims with any precision.143  The Supreme Court 
did place some limitations on the federal courts’ discretion, requiring 
that those causes of action rest on a “norm of international character 
accepted by the civilized world and defined with specificity comparable 
to the features of the 18th century paradigm.”144  Because the Court did 
 
 139. David L. Hudson, Jr., Foreign Turf: Human Rights Suits Against Corporations Hinge on 
How Open the Door Is, 90 A.B.A. J. 20 (2004).  The Supreme Court’s ruling in Sosa “that 
potentially opened the door to suits against international corporations has left plenty of room to 
widen the entranceway.”  Id.  Cases against ExxonMobil, Coca-Cola, Del Monte and 
DaimlerChrysler “will determine exactly how much give is in the hinges.”  Id.  C.f. id. (presenting 
the alternative interpretation of the Supreme Court’s ruling that it “will dismiss virtually all of the 
existing cases”). 
 140. Leading Case, supra note 46, at 456. 
 141. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 725. 
 142. Id. at 738 (declining to acknowledge transborder abduction as a customary law that could 
be fitted inside the “law of nations” cause of action of the ATS). 
 143. Preserving the functionality of the ATS in this way might be considered consistent with 
the original purpose for the ATS.  Anthony D’Amato, Comment, The Alien Tort Statute and the 
Founding of the Constitution, 82 AM. J. INT’L L. 62, 67 (1988).  Although the “imperative security 
interests that animated” the young and relatively defenseless nation to enact legislation that would 
keep the stronger British and French from resorting to war when civil remedies were unavailable do 
not concern the United States presently: 
[T]he perception that we will deal fairly and impartially with cases having foreign 
implications, and not make political bargaining chips out of them, is still significant in 
terms of our national ideals, which include a free economic market, basic political 
freedoms for all people and willingness to submit to the rule of law. 
Id. 
 144. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 745.  Those causes of action might “arguably now extend[] to ‘piracy, 
slave trade, attacks on or hijacking of aircraft, genocide, war crimes, and perhaps terrorism.’”  
Casto, supra note 23, at 486 (quoting RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW (REVISED) § 404 
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not expound beyond merely announcing the standard that should apply, 
it is difficult to identify which claims the Supreme Court anticipates the 
federal courts should recognize.145  The list could include “genocide, 
extra-judicial killing, torture, war crimes, slavery, and extreme arbitrary 
detention.”146  Leaving this door ajar, as proposed by Justice Souter,147 
would supposedly invite only the most widely accepted customary 
international law into federal courts.148  Only the closest adherence to 
this standard by the federal courts would allow the true intent of the ATS 
Framers to be realized.149 
 
(Tent. Draft No. 6, 1985)).  The current version of the Restatement of Foreign Relations (Third) 
includes an almost identical list where jurisdiction arises over “certain offenses recognized by the 
community of nations as of universal concern.”  RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW 
(THIRD) § 404 (2004). The important distinction here is that these “extensions” to the causes of 
action under the ATS “appear to be based on specific intentional covenants and agreements rather 
than customary law.”  Casto, supra note 23, at 486; see generally Russell S. Kerr, U.S. Supreme 
Court Leaves “Door Ajar,” 46 ORANGE COUNTY LAW. MAG. 22, 23 (2004) (discussing the 
standard imposed by the Court). 
 145. Eugene Kontorovich, Implementing Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain: What Piracy Law Reveals 
About the Limits of the Alien Tort Statute, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 111, 113 (2004).  “Applying 
this test to a variety of purported new international norms will become a significant subject of 
litigation in the lower courts in the wake of Sosa, litigation that could result in conflicting decisions 
due to the Court’s scant description of the test it envisions.”  Id.  According to one human rights 
proponent, who suggests that multinational corporations should have no complaints regarding the 
new life given to the ATS by the Supreme Court, the violations that can be considered “specific, 
universal and obligatory” are a “short list.”  Jonathan Birchall, The Limits of Human Rights 
Legislation: Alien Tort Statute: Jonathan Birchall on How Two Cases Have Tested the Scope of 
Law Allowing U.S. Companies To Be Sued for Wrongs Committed Overseas, FINANCIAL TIMES, 
January 20, 2005, at 13. 
 146. Birchall, supra note 145, at 13. 
 147. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 729. 
 148. Kerr, supra note 144, at 23 (predicting that “[o]nly a few international tort claims brought 
by foreigners will meet the ‘specificity’ criteria required of Sosa”).  Drawing from the precedent set 
by the Filartiga court and subsequent decisions, the courts might continue to recognize the 
customary international laws that include “a universal abhorrence against torture, extra-judicial 
killings, genocide, prolonged arbitrary, [sic] detentions, disappearances, and slavery.”  Id. at 24.  
But see Casto, supra note 23, at 475 (acknowledging the “serious doubt” as to “whether 
international law, unassisted by domestic law, creates a tort remedy that may be invoked in 
domestic courts by private individuals”).  A cause of action that the federal courts might recognize 
under the ATS and by virtue of the Sosa decision would be “an international remedy in name only.”  
Id. at 477.  Because the remedy would be absorbed into U.S. law in this manner, “[t]o suggest that 
the remedy is based on international law would be disingenuous.” Id. 
 149. Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 32, at 362.  But see Kontorovich, supra note 145, at 
155-56 (theorizing that only piracy can have a modern counterpart in customary international law 
because it is the only action from the law of nations that was not limited to a “specially protected 
classes of foreigners”).  Following this line of reasoning, because “[m]odern human rights offenses 
are not substantially ‘comparable’ to piracy, the benchmark offense,” the new customary law norms 
cannot pass the standard set in Sosa. Id. at 161. 
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2.  A Restrained Discretion?150 
More troublesome than the flexible standard discussed above is the 
residual, undefined discretion left to the federal courts by the Sosa 
decision to determine what claims to entertain under the ATS.151  
Consistent with the Second Circuit’s Filartiga decision152 and the line of 
cases that followed,153 Justice Souter would allow the federal courts to 
continue to determine when U.S. courts have jurisdiction over various 
human rights infractions, exposing the U.S. to foreign policy 
complications long before these cases reach Supreme Court review.154  
This discretion would authorize the “federal courts to define and enforce 
violations of the law of nations in suits invoking the jurisdiction of the 
federal courts under the ATS.”155  Because the Sosa Court did not 
definitively close the door to undefined tort claims permitted under the 
ATS (as Justice Scalia encouraged),156 the federal courts are now 
empowered to become the judicial branch of worldwide human rights 
litigation.  By failing to articulate precisely the extent of the ATS’s 
absorption of customary international law, the Supreme Court required 
difficult determinations by the lower courts regarding the 
 
 150. See supra note 101 and infra note 198 (identifying Justice Souter’s five reasons for the 
exercise of discretion by the lower courts). 
 151. David D. Caron & Brad R. Roth eds., International Decision: Scope of Alien Tort Statute 
– Arbitrary Arrest and Detention as Violations of Custom, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 798, 804 (2004).  
“The Sosa decision announces the existence of strict limits to the power of courts to establish 
international law-based causes of action under the ATS, but does relatively little, in practical terms, 
to specify those limits.”  Id. 
 152. See supra notes 54-65 and accompanying text (examining Filartiga). 
 153. See supra note 60 (listing the cases following Filartiga and their holdings). 
 154. Martin S. Flaherty, Future and Past of U.S. Foreign Relations Law, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 169, 173 (2004).  “Despite an excess of cautionary rhetoric, the Court in essence upheld 
modern litigation under the [ATS] . . . the Sosa  plurality guaranteed that the federal judiciary’s duty 
to engage with international legal standards in ATS suits would continue.”  Id. 
 155. Garre, supra note 65, at 4. 
 156. See infra notes 166-175 and accompanying text (analyzing an interpretation of the ATS 
consistent with Justice Scalia’s concurring opinion).  Justice Souter might have been indicating the 
level of discretion left to the federal courts with the language he used to reject Alvarez-Machain’s 
claim for arbitrary arrest and transborder abduction: 
Whatever may be said for the broad principle Alvarez advances, in the present, imperfect 
world, it expresses an aspiration that exceeds any binding customary rule having the 
specificity we require.  Creating a private cause of action to further that aspiration would 
go beyond any residual common law discretion we think it appropriate to exercise.  It is 
enough to hold that a single illegal detention of less than a day, followed by the transfer 
of custody to lawful authorities and a prompt arraignment, violates no norm of 
customary international law so well defined as to support the creation of a federal 
remedy. 
Sosa, 542 U.S. at 738.   
27
D'Amore: Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2006
DAMORE1.DOC 4/14/2006  1:15:04 PM 
620 AKRON LAW REVIEW [39:593 
appropriateness of ATS claims.157 
Tempered only by the Supreme Court’s standard that the customary 
law at hand be “accepted by the civilized world and defined with a 
specificity comparable to the features of the 18th-century paradigms,”158 
the federal courts will continue to produce a wide array of decisions that 
stretch the concept of accepted customary international law.159  Because 
the Sosa decision failed to delineate a precise expectation of the 
discretion to be used, conflicting decisions in the lower courts are 
likely.160  The lower courts will undoubtedly produce erratic decisions 
and will allow claims other than those that have genuinely reached the 
level of customary law.161  In fact, 
[E]xperience teaches that the discovery of a new or forgotten judicial 
power is often marked by efforts to experiment with and, in some 
cases, abuse that power.  Indeed, as a practical matter, lower courts that 
were willing to infer international law-based causes of action from the 
pure jurisdictional language of the ATS before Sosa may only be 
emboldened by the court’s decision announcing that the federal courts 
possess an inherent lawmaking authority when it comes to policing the 
violation of customary international law norms the world over.162 
The fluidity of the “residual common law discretion” signals hope 
for human rights advocates,163 threatens the deep pockets of 
multinational corporations,164 and has elicited opposition by the 
 
 157. See Leading Case, supra note 46, at 446 (lamenting that “Sosa failed to articulate a clear 
conception of the interaction between customary international law and domestic law, and offers 
little guidance to lower courts both within ATS doctrine and beyond”).  The “rhetoric” of the Sosa 
plurality cautioned against the expansion of the ATS to include claims arising from customary law, 
but “fail[ed] to clarify one of the most important, and most opaque, elements in the opinion: its 
articulation of the role of customary international law in U.S. law.”  Id. at 451. 
 158. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 725.  See supra notes 113-26 and accompanying text (discussing the 
Court’s advisement that the international norms adhere to this standard);  see also supra notes 142-
49 and accompanying text (exploring the usability of the ATS when held strictly to that standard). 
 159. An indicator of this liberal trend is the line of cases that followed Filartiga and preceded 
Sosa.  See supra note 60 (listing these cases and their holdings). 
 160. Kontorovich, supra note 145, at 113. 
 161. Leading Case, supra note 46, at 455; Kontorovich, supra note 145, at 113 (predicting 
“conflicting decisions” as a result of the “scant description” of the Supreme Court test in Sosa). 
 162. Garre, supra note 64, at 4. 
 163. See Kochan, supra note 52, at 261-64 (suggesting that human rights organizations will 
embrace the discretion given to the courts and capitalize on this leeway by increasing “customary 
law outputs” that will bring additional human rights claims under ATS jurisdiction).  See infra notes 
178-182 and accompanying text (discussing the efforts of human rights activists).   
 164. See infra notes 183-189 and accompanying text (discussing the effect ATS litigation will 
have on multinational corporations). 
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executive branch of the U.S. government.165 
3.  “[T]he deed was done in Erie”166 
The federal courts would be giving the ATS its most accurate 
interpretation by recognizing that the extinction of federal common law 
also destroyed any causes of action that arise from the customary 
international law suggested by the “law of nations” in the ATS.167  
Limiting the ATS’s substantive reach would be consistent with the 
Supreme Court’s other efforts to restrict the “extraterritorial scope” of 
the courts, which can interfere with the policy considerations of the 
political branches.168  This approach would reduce the ATS to a statute 
 
 165. Brief for the United States as Respondent Supporting Petitioner, Sosa v. Alvarez-
Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004) (No. 03-339).  The Solicitor General echoed Justice Souter’s 
wariness regarding the federal courts continued interference in the lawmaking realm of the political 
branches, but issued a stronger warning in his brief to the Supreme Court in support of the petitioner 
Sosa. Id. at 28. 
The inherently indeterminate nature of customary international law makes it a singularly 
ill-suited basis for the creation of private rights of action.  Nor . . . does the idea of 
judges searching through ungratified treaties and other sources of customary 
international law documents to discover private rights have anything to recommend to it.  
Indeed, if courts really had such an extraordinary power, then there would be little point 
in the close scrutiny given to treaties and other international conventions by the Senate 
and Executive in determining whether to ratify a treaty. 
Id. at 28-29. 
 166. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 746 (Scalia, J., concurring).  Justice Scalia argued that there is no “‘door 
to further independent judicial recognition of actionable international norms’ . . . ‘still ajar subject to 
vigilant doorkeeping’” because Erie had already closed the door to general common law.  Id. 
(quoting plurality opinion at 729). 
 167. See Casto, supra note 23, at 477 (warning that an attempt to develop this type of 
international common tort law “would lead the federal courts down a path similar to the one rejected 
in Erie).  But see Leading Case, supra note 46, at 452 (rejecting this position because it ignores “the 
federal interest in vindicating international law norms as part of a unified foreign policy” and 
“downplays the extent to which the intent behind the ATS was to empower the federal government 
to act on such matters”).  Justice Scalia might, in the opinion of one observer, be “conflat[ing] a 
skepticism of the courts’ capacity to recognize modern customary norms with his views of the 
effects wrought by Erie on judicial authority.”  Id.  Justice Scalia’s position that Erie precludes 
customary international law from being a cause of action under the ATS is also flawed in that it is 
inconsistent with his willingness to recognize claims for the “law of nations” as they existed in 
1789.  Id. at 452-53; see also supra notes 33-43 and accompanying text (discussing the Founding 
Fathers’ concept of “law of nations”). 
 168. Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 32, at 362.  “The plan of the Constitution counsels 
hesitation.”  Casto, supra note 23, at 482.  The exclusive foreign policy role of the presidency and 
the congress’s responsibility for ratifying treaties and declaring war leaves little room for the 
judiciary to enjoy a “policymaking role in matters concerning foreign policy.”  Id.  Considering the 
Court’s other decisions to limit the extraterritorial scope of the courts, Bradley & Goldsmith, supra 
note 32, at 362 n. 233, it seems incongruous that the plurality did not concur with Justice Scalia’s 
wish to shut the door to international policy making by the courts.  See id.  The ATS invites such a 
limit on extraterritorial scope in light of these other limiting decisions, and also because the 
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allowing the claims of aliens only for law of nations violations 
embedded in the original intent of the Framers: “Violations of safe 
conduct, infringement of the rights of ambassadors, and piracy.”169  To 
do otherwise would perpetuate a modern trend of the federal courts to 
impinge on the duties more appropriately handled by the other branches 
of government: in this case making foreign policy decisions better left to 
the Executive.170  It is unlikely that the First Congress ever intended the 
ATS to create “federal substantive rights” or the “federal common law 
making” that the plurality’s decision authorizes.171  Giving the statute an 
interpretation that is inconsistent with Erie is “a structurally 
objectionable step.”172 The ATS should have new life as a viable 
 
international subject matter particularly infringes on the political branches’ role in creating foreign 
policy.  Id.  Additionally, the 1789 drafters of the ATS would never have considered such liberal 
discretion in the courts.  Id. 
 169. Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 32, at 359.  Customary international law cannot be 
incorporated into the ATS “law of nations” because the eighteenth century understanding of 
international law would not have included the modern concept of human rights issues that 
encompasses “the way a foreign nation treats its citizens.” Id.  Despite the obscure origins of the 
ATS, there is a strong consensus that the ATS “does not create a statutory cause of action.  The 
statute is purely jurisdictional and the first Congress undoubtedly understood this to be the case.”  
Casto, supra note 23, at 479 (internal footnotes omitted).  An alternative school of thought, 
however, is that customary international law exists outside of the federal common law, and is 
instead a separate body of substantive law that can be applied in appropriate cases where the court 
has jurisdiction over an international issue.  Aleinikoff, supra note 53, at 97. 
 170. See supra note 168 (setting forth the authority which supports this contention). 
 171. Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 32, at 359.  While conceding that there are multiple 
constructions of the ATS, some of which are “more plausible than others,” these authors suggest 
that focusing on the original language of the ATS reveals precisely what the First Congress 
intended: that the district courts have “cognizance” – or jurisdiction – over the claims of aliens, but 
stops short of granting the courts the power of substantive law making.  Id. at 358-59.  This 
jurisdiction-only interpretation is bolstered by the modern codification of the ATS at 28 U.S.C. 
§1350 where jurisdiction is substituted for “cognizance.”  Casto, supra note 23, at 479.  See 
generally Kenneth C. Randall, Federal Jurisdiction Over International Law Claims: Inquiries Into 
the Alien Tort Statute, 18 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 1 (1985) (discussing the jurisdictional aspects 
of the ATS).  But see William S. Dodge, The Constitutionality of the Alien Tort Statute: Some 
Observations on Text and Context, 42 VA. J. INT’L. L. 687, 689-90 (2002) (arguing that the First 
Congress could not have realized the need to articulate anything further than jurisdiction because 
“cause of action” as we understand it today did not exist in the early American legal consciousness) 
[hereinafter Dodge, Constitutionality].  “The First Congress assumed that torts in violation of the 
law of nations would be cognizable at common law, just as any other tort would be.” Id. at 690; see 
also Haberstroh, supra note 26, at 249.  Courts that do not recognize a cause of action in the ATS 
give the statute an “ahistorical” interpretation.  Dodge, Constitutionality, supra, at 690.  The federal 
courts that do “read the [ATS] as granting a cause of action,” such as the Filartiga court, do so 
“precisely to eliminate this anachronism.”  Id. 
 172. J. Harvey Wilkinson, III, Our Structural Constitution, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1687, 1694 
(2004).  “[I]n breaching the line between prescriptive and interpretive power, the Court risked a 
retreat to the [pre-Erie era], which assigned to the judiciary, under the guise of federal common law, 
an impermissible prescriptive task.” Id.  But see Ralph G. Steinhardt, The Alien Tort Claims Act: 
Theoretical and Historical Foundations of the Alien Tort Claims Act and Its Discontents: A Reality 
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jurisdictional statute in U.S. courts only after Congress codifies those 
international law causes of action for which jurisdiction can apply.173  If 
a lack of authority for the federal courts to create federal common law 
were properly acknowledged,174 the courts could not recognize any 
causes of action under the ATS, even as extrapolation from the core 
conceptual basis of the Founder’s “law of nations.”175 
B.  The Alien Tort Statute’s Modern Importance 
Regardless of the interpretation given to the ATS, the efforts of 
litigators have already resurrected the statute, and it will play a pivotal 
role in the United States approach to human rights violations, 
cooperation with multinational corporations, and its own foreign 
policy.176 Observers can glean the potential consequences of Sosa from 
the range of amicus curiae briefs filed in the case.177 
 
Check, 16 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 585, 605 (2004) (attacking the argument that the Filartiga line of 
cases needs to be abrogated). 
[T]hose who would gut the [ATS] through judicial interpretation or Congressional repeal 
offer a non-solution to a non-problem by exaggerating the law of nations as some 
expansive and amorphous body of law created without the dominant influence of the 
United States for more than two centuries, underestimating the ability of the courts to 
derail abusive or frivolous lawsuits, and underestimating the value of the [ATS] in 
assuring that the United States does not become a safe haven for abusers. 
Id. 
 173. Leading Case, supra note 46, at 456. The “nebulous” decision in Sosa could very well be 
a “cry for congressional help.”  Id. 
 174. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 741 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 175. This focused interpretation of the ATS would render the statute practically worthless until 
Congress initiates legislation to expand the statute.  See infra note 197 (suggesting that Congress 
does so).  Justice Scalia would likely be unwilling to allow ATS as the jurisdictional basis for an 
alien’s claim in federal court unless the famous pirate Blackbeard were named as a defendant. 
 176. See infra notes 178-196 and accompanying text (outlining each of these ways in which the 
ATS will be implicated).  To briefly illustrate the pronounced presence the ATS will have in the 
coming years, consider one potential alien plaintiff relying on the ATS for jurisdiction in a U.S. 
federal court: Osama Bin Laden.  Jamie Shapiro, Note and Comment, Aliens’ Redress of Grievances 
Against the United States for International Human Rights Violations, 10 SW. J. OF L. & TRADE AM. 
195, 217 (2003/2004).  If ever captured, the number one enemy of the United States could have a 
claim nearly analogous to the one posited by Alvarez-Machain.  Id. 
 177. The organizations that filed briefs are as varied as the potential post-Sosa ATS litigation.  
Writing briefs in support of the Petitioner were: The Pacific Legal Foundation (a nonprofit public 
interest group providing “a voice in the courts for thousands of Americans who believe in 
constitutionally grounded government, including adherence to the principles of separation of 
powers, democratic consent, and limited federal judicial powers.)” Brief Amicus Curiae of Pacific 
Legal Foundation in Support of Petitioner at 1, Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004) (No. 
03-339); Professors of International Law, Federal Jurisdiction and the Foreign Relations Law of the 
United States (a group of law professors with noted expertise in those disciplines), Brief for 
Professors of International Law, Federal Jurisdiction and the Foreign Relations Law of the United 
States as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 1, Sosa, 542 U.S. 692 (No. 03-339); the 
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Washington Legal Foundation (a nonprofit public interest group devoted to issues “involving 
national security, civil-justice reform and federalism and opposes the expansion of federal-court 
jurisdiction beyond appropriate statutory and constitutional limits”), the National Fraternal Order of 
Police (a 310,000 member law enforcement labor organization), and the Allied Education 
Foundation (a charitable foundation engaged in promoting “education in diverse areas of study, 
such as law and public policy”), Brief of Washington Legal Foundation, National Fraternal Order of 
Police, and Allied Educational Foundation as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 1-2, Sosa, 
542 U.S. 692 (No. 03-339); the National Association of Manufacturers (“the nation’s largest broad-
based industrial trade association,” with many of its members having operations abroad), Brief for 
the National Association of Manufacturers as Amicus Curiae in Support of Reversal at 1, Sosa, 542 
U.S. 692  (No. 03-339); and the National Foreign Trade Council (“the premier business organization 
advocating a rules-based world economy” with over 300 member companies), USA*Engage (a 
broad-based coalition “concerned about the proliferation of unilateral foreign policy sanctions at the 
federal, state, and local levels”), the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America (“the 
world’s largest business federation” with over three million members doing business in the United 
States and around the world), the United States Council for Organization in International Investment 
(“a business advocacy and policy development group” serving as the “American affiliate of the 
International Chamber of Commerce and International Organization of Employers), the 
International Chamber of Commerce (the world business organization which represents the 
chambers of commerce and other business associations of 130 countries, with a goal to “promote 
multilateral trade among nations in the interest of global prosperity”), the Organization for 
International Investment (“the largest business association in the United States representing the 
interests of U.S. subsidiaries of international companies”), the Business Roundtable (“an association 
of CEOs of leading U.S. corporations . . . committed to vigorous economic growth, a dynamic 
global economy, and the well-trained and productive U.S. workforce essential for future 
competitiveness”), the American Petroleum Institute (a 450 member group from “all aspects of the 
petroleum industry . . . operat[ing] throughout the world as part of their commitment to meet 
America’s energy needs”), and the US-ASEAN Business Council (“America’s leading private 
business organization dedicated to promoting increased trade and investment between the United 
States and the member nations of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations”), Brief for the 
National Foreign Trade Council, USA*Engage, the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of 
America, the United States Council for Organization in International Investment, the International 
Chamber of Commerce, the Organization for International Investment, the Business Roundtable, the 
American Petroleum Institute, and the US-ASEAN Business Council as Amici Curiae in Support of 
Petitioner at 1-3, Sosa, 542 U.S. 692 (No. 03-339)[hereinafter NFTC et al. Brief]. 
  Those organizations and groups filing briefs in support of the Respondent Alvarez-
Machain were: National and Foreign Legal Scholars (75 scholars from nations around the world, 
“including Australia, Canada, Ireland, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, 
and the United States”), Brief of Amici Curiae National and Foreign Legal Scholars in Support of 
Respondents at 1, Sosa, 542 U.S. 692  (No. 03-339); Hungarian Jews (plaintiffs in a pending U.S. 
District Court case alleging claims against the United States under the ATS for failure to return 
“personal possessions and family heirlooms . . . accepted into protective custody”)  and 
Bougainvilleans (plaintiffs in an ATS case alleging claims of “genocide, war crimes, and crimes 
against humanity” against a private corporation), Brief of Amici Curiae Alien Friends Representing 
Hungarian Jews and Bougainvilleans Interests in Support of Respondent at 1, Sosa, 542 U.S. 692  
(No. 03-339); Professors of Federal Jurisdiction and Legal History (a group of professors with 
expertise in the relevant areas interested in the “proper understanding and interpretation of the 
[ATS]”), Brief of Professors of Federal Jurisdiction and Legal History as Amici Curiae in Support 
of Respondents at 1, Sosa, 542 U.S. 692  (No. 03-339); Corporate Social Responsibility Amici (a 
collection of international groups working “to develop, implement or support mechanisms to 
improve corporate compliance with human rights standards in the global economy”), Brief of Amici 
Curiae Corporate Social Responsibility Amici in Support of Respondent at 1, Sosa, 542 U.S. 692  
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1.  Human Rights Activists Emboldened 
By not seizing the opportunity to forever banish international 
human rights claims from federal courts, the Supreme Court sustained 
hope for numerous human rights victims and their supporting 
organizations.178  The ATS, when given the interpretation of the 
 
(No. 03-339) [hereinafter CSR Amici Brief]; the Presbyterian Church of Sudan (“an unincorporated 
association of more than 35,000 members of the Presbyterian faith” that is a plaintiff in a class 
action ATS case against a Canadian oil company, Talisman Energy, Inc. that allegedly collaborated 
to commit “genocide, war crimes, extrajudicial murder, forcible displacement, torture and other 
crimes against humanity” in which “[c]hurches, congregations and ministers are alleged to be 
particular targets”) and the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.) (intending “to 
support its sister denominations around the world”), Brief for the Presbyterian Church of Sudan and 
Clifton Kirkpatrick as Stated Clerk of the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.) as 
Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent at 1-2, Sosa, 542 U.S. 692 (No. 03-339); Career Foreign 
Service Diplomats (twenty-eight U.S. Foreign Service members, many of whom served as 
ambassadors), Brief of Amici Curiae Career Foreign Service Diplomats in Support of Respondent at 
1-9, Sosa, 542 U.S. 692 (No. 03-339); Women’s Human Rights Organizations (a gathering of 
numerous U.S. and foreign women’s human rights organizations “working to end impunity for 
grave violations of human rights of women, to challenge violations, and to support women seeking 
justice”), Brief as Amici Curiae of Women’s Human Rights Organizations in Support of 
Respondent at 1, Sosa, 542 U.S. 692 (No. 03-339); Human Rights Organizations and Religious 
Organizations (“dozens of human rights organizations and religious organizations working to 
protect basic human rights in this country and around the world”), Brief of Amici Curiae 
International Human Rights Organizations and Religious Organizations in Support of Respondent at 
1, Sosa, 542 U.S. 692 (No. 03-339) [hereinafter Human Rights Organizations Brief]; International 
Jurists (“jurists who have served as judges and experts on international human rights bodies around 
the world”), Brief of Amici Curiae International Jurists in Support of Affirmance at 1, Sosa, 542 
U.S. 692 (No. 03-339); Surviving family members of the victims of the September 11, 2001 
Terrorist Attacks (wishing “to ensure that every survivor of terrorist attacks, and the family 
members of those who perish in terrorist attacks, regardless of their nationality, are able to pursue 
civil suits against terrorists”), Brief of Amici Curiae Surviving Family Members of the Victims of 
the September 11, 2001 Terrorist Attacks in Support of Respondents at 1, Sosa, 542 U.S. 692  (No. 
03-339); and the World Jewish Congress (“an international federation of Jewish communities . . . 
that played a leading role in the Holocaust restitution movement, which included litigation using the 
[ATS]”) and the American Jewish Committee (“a national human relations organization . . . founded 
to protect the civil rights and religious liberty of Jews”), Brief for the World Jewish Congress and 
the American Jewish Committee as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 1-2, Sosa, 542 U.S. 
692 (No. 03-339). 
  The European Commission (“the executive body of the European Community, a treaty-
based international organization that has competence to develop and enforce Community-wide 
legislation in specified areas of policy”) filed a Brief of Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party.  
Brief of Amicus Curiae the European Commission in Support of Neither Party at 1, Sosa, 542 U.S. 
692 (No. 03-339). 
 178. Baluarte, supra note 91, at 13.  While criticizing the Court for “miss[ing] an opportunity 
to promote international norms that apply to all countries,” Baluarte urges that activists should not 
be deterred.  Id.  See also Elizabeth F. Defeis, Litigating Human Rights Abuses in United States 
Courts: Recent Developments, 10 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 319, 319 (2004) (suggesting that the 
ATS is “[t]he most utilized legislative device for reaching human rights abuses” and inferring that 
favorable interpretation of the ATS would preserve this important avenue for addressing human 
rights issues).  But see Wynne P. Kelley, Comment, Citizens Cannot Stand For It Anymore: How 
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Filartiga court or Justice Souter’s “ajar door” approach, is “a basic tool 
to apply limited – but binding – standards to corporations in their 
international operations.”179  The accessibility of federal courts to human 
rights victims has numerous positives.180  However, in order to preserve 
judicial resources and prevent abuse of the federal court system by 
litigious aliens, the courts must restrict this access by recognizing only 
those victims of the most widely accepted customary international law 
violations.181  Human rights activists will seize on to the ATS as a means 
to redress the violations of the host nations where multinational 
 
The United States’ Environmental Actions in Afghanistan and Iraq Go Unchecked by Individuals 
and Non-Governmental Organizations, 28 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 193, 227 (2004) (lamenting the 
narrowness of the Sosa decision for its implied preclusion from ATS litigation of potential 
environmentally related human rights claims with potential damages over $20 billion). 
 179. Terry Collingsworth, “Corporate Social Responsibility,” Unmasked, 16 ST. THOMAS L. 
REV. 669, 686 (2004).  See Sonia Jimenez, Note and Comment, The Alien Tort Claims Act: A Tool 
for Repairing Ethically Challenged U.S. Corporations, 16 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 721 (2004); Gabriel 
D. Pinilla, Note and Comment, Corporate Liability for Human Rights Violations on Foreign Soil: A 
Historical and Prospective Analysis of the Alien Tort Claims Controversy, 16 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 
687 (2004). 
 180. Human Rights Organizations Brief, supra note 177.  The human rights organizations’ 
argue in support of a liberally construed ATS because the ATS provides a means of enforcement 
that is otherwise hard to come by.  Id. at 2. 
Despite the universal condemnation of these human rights violations, perpetrators all too 
often escape punishment.  Finding means to hold perpetrators accountable is a key 
priority for governments, including the U.S. government, as well as for international and 
nongovernmental organizations around the world.  Domestic and international actors 
have undertaken varied initiatives, including criminal prosecutions initiated both by 
public prosecutors and by private individuals, civil litigation, and assorted administrative 
proceedings. Each state chooses mechanisms appropriate to its local legal system.  Civil 
litigation under the [ATS] is part of a global effort to address impunity and to hold 
perpetrators of egregious abuses accountable for their actions. 
Id. 
 181. While encouraging a modernized “law of nations” and the use of the ATS for the human 
rights claims of aliens, one observer warns that enthusiastic human rights activists “may actually 
threaten the statute, when they attempt to use [ATS] to attack wrongs, such as the softer shades of 
third-party complicity, which a world consensus has not decided are in violation of customary 
international law.” Haberstroh, supra note 26, at 271.  Additional concerns surround the economic 
viability of nations that might be saddled with large damages from ATS litigation.  HUFBAUER & 
MITROKOSTAS, AWAKENING MONSTER, supra note 7, at 13.  Those countries include Saudi Arabia, 
Abu Dhabi, Ecuador, Indonesia, Nigeria, Burma, Egypt, Germany, Papua New Guinea, Japan, 
Guatemala, Colombia, Peru, Sudan, and South Africa.  Id. Japan and Germany were included in this 
list because they were exposed to ATS litigation on the basis of their egregious human rights 
violations during World War II.  Id.  A corollary exists between poverty-stricken nations and a “low 
regard for human rights, measured against US standards, coupled with limited political and 
economic freedom.”  Id.  Monetary liability in U.S. courts could therefore severely impede these 
impoverished nations from ever improving their economic situation and, in turn, contribute to their 
failure to rectify their almost unavoidable (although inexcusable) violations of human rights.  Id. at 
13-14. 
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corporations are often immersed in human rights predicaments.182 
2.  Multinational Corporations Threatened 
The potential litigation against multi-national corporations under 
the ATS raises concern for American businesses and their continued 
competitiveness in the global economy.183  Despite activists’ strong 
support for federal jurisdiction over human rights violations, concerns 
emerge as to the impact this course could have on major U.S. 
corporations, specifically those with multinational operations.184  
 
 182. See supra note 60 (detailing the numerous human rights cases brought in federal courts 
using Filartiga’s liberal ATS interpretation); see also Hufbauer & Mitrokostas, International 
Implications, supra note 7, at 607 (postulating that thousands of Chinese citizens could invoke the 
ATS – “organized by plaintiffs’ attorneys and supported by international human rights groups” – 
against multinational corporations for “abetting” China’s alleged human rights violations); Paul 
Magnusson, A Milestone for Human Rights, BUSINESS WEEK, January 24, 2005, at 63 (listing the 
major U.S. corporations who are, or will likely be, defending ATS suits).  “Other defendants include 
Coca-Cola, Drummond, Occidental Petroleum, and Del Monte Foods.”  Magnusson, supra.  See 
generally Mark J. Leavy, Note, Discrediting Human Rights Abuse as an “Act of State”: a Case 
Study on the Repression of the Falun Gong in China and Commentary on International Human 
Rights Law in U.S. Courts, 35 RUTGERS L. J. 749 (2004) (examining the pending companion cases 
of Chinese plaintiffs directly against the government officials of the People’s Republic of China and 
relying on the ATS for jurisdiction in U.S. courts).  See also Oscar Gonzales, Attacking the ATS: 
Prison Abuse Scandal Highlights Need for Access to U.S. Courts, 20 TX LAW., July 12, 2004 
(identifying the already-filed claims of Iraqi prisoners using the ATS as the basis for their 
jurisdiction for their claims against U.S. private contractors of torture and executions at the 
infamous Abu Ghraib prison and other Iraqi detention facilities). 
 183. U.S. companies with direct ties to countries with human rights issues are prone to ATS 
litigation.  HUFBAUER & MITROKOSTAS, AWAKENING MONSTER, supra note 7, at 37; see supra note 
181 (listing the foreign states that are categorized as nations with human rights issues).  This 
includes companies engaged in oil and mineral imports from foreign nations, but also those 
exporting U.S. goods to the same nations.  HUFBAUER & MITROKOSTAS, AWAKENING MONSTER, 
supra note 7, at 16.  Even institutions which lend money to those nations may be susceptible.  Id. at 
17.  “It is no exaggeration to say that every major international bank is exposed to ATS liability.”  
Id.  “[T]he ATS has been transformed from its intended role as a jurisdictional provision applicable 
to a small class of cases into a serious impediment to companies engaged in international trade, 
investment, and operations, and a major irritant to the United States in its dealing with other 
nations.”  NFTC et al. Brief, supra note 177, at 5.  But see CSR Amici Brief, supra note 177, at 6 
(arguing that the multinational corporations exaggerate the effect the ATS will have on their profits 
and accusing these corporations of interfering with the “substantial precedent demonstrating that the 
U.S. has been a leader in applying the rule of law to human rights violations”).  “The [ATS]’s very 
limited scope poses absolutely no threat to foreign investment by U.S. companies.”  Id. 
 184. See HUFBAUER & MITROKOSTAS, AWAKENING MONSTER, supra note 7, at 1-2 (outlining 
a “nightmare scenario” if the ATS interpretation can reach multinational corporations and warning 
that “trial lawyers will seek to expand the scope of the ATS . . . to such an extent that investment 
and trade in developing countries will be seriously threatened”).  Because the ATS has only in 
recent years been suggested as a litigation tool against corporate defendants, it is difficult to 
ascertain the “potential scope of ATS litigation.”  Hufbauer & Mitrokostas, International 
Implications, supra note 7, at 615.  The possible breadth of claims is comparable to the asbestos 
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Multinational corporations risk exposure to human rights litigation by 
virtue of doing business in a country that perpetrates, sponsors, endorses, 
or even tolerates human rights abuses.185 If these multinational 
corporations are subject to alien tort claims, the magnitude of the 
damages would be noticeable in the U.S. economy.186  In the minds of 
the foremost trade and business organizations in the United States, “the 
erroneous interpretation and expansion of the [ATS] . . . wreaks 
economic damage.”187  Corporations are already settling suits188 to avoid 
 
litigation of the late 20th century.  Id.  “Asbestos spawned the largest mass tort litigation in legal 
history,” Id. at 614, with over 300 corporate defendants named and damages at $54 billion and 
growing.  Id. at 614  n.41. 
 185. HUFBAUER & MITROKOSTAS, AWAKENING MONSTER, supra note 7, at 9.  Multinational 
corporations are sued for “aiding and abetting” human rights violations, particularly when sovereign 
immunity precludes the alien plaintiffs from suing the offending foreign state itself.  Id.  The circuit 
courts have permitted these aiding and abetting claims against multinational corporations, requiring 
only that the corporation gave “knowing practical assistance or encouragement which has a 
substantial effect on the perpetration of the crime.” Id. (quoting Doe v. Unocal Corp, 395 F.3d 932, 
947 (9th Cir 2002)).  The claims against corporations range from “environmental torts, expropriated 
property claims, and human rights violations committed by host governments.”  Konrad L. Cailteux 
and B. Keith Gibson, “Alien Tort Statute” Shakedown: Court Must Arrest New Attempt to Expand 
Mischievous U.S. Law, 20 LEGAL BACKGROUNDER, January 14, 2005.  See generally Ronen 
Shamir, Between Self-Regulation and the Alien Tort Claims Act: On the Contested Concept of 
Corporate Social Responsibility, 38 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 635, 637-43 (2004) (laying out the general 
background of ATS cases against multinational corporations).  The claims against corporations are 
“based on dubious theories of vicarious liability.”  Cailteux & Gibson, supra.  The claims 
significantly affect the operations of these corporations because “[a]lthough most courts have 
recognized the impropriety of these suits, and have dismissed the claims, this influx of cases has 
cost United States corporations significant, unnecessary legal fees, discovery costs, and lost 
employee time.”  Id.  But see Gonzales, supra note 182 (arguing that corporations should have had 
fair warning “all along about the importance of ATS compliance”).  Gonzales argues that, rather 
than focusing their energies on improving human rights conditions, “all corporate America’s 
energies are focused on advancing anti-ATS arguments that are, generously speaking, suspect.”  Id. 
 186. NFTC et al. Brief, supra note 177, at 5.  The multi-national corporations mobilized to 
assert their opposition to the inclusion of customary law in the ATS for the Supreme Court’s 
decision for Sosa because they recognized the potential economic impact exposure to ATS litigation 
would cause them.  See generally HUFBAUER & MITROKOSTAS, AWAKENING MONSTER, supra note 
7, at 37- 43 (hypothesizing on the economic impact ATS legislation will have in the United States).  
But see Collingsworth, supra note 179, at 670 (criticizing the business community because it 
“simply could not resist going after the [ATS] at full bore at the first opportunity to nip in the bud 
any prospect that the U.S. companies could possibly be held accountable for human rights violations 
committed in the course of their international operations”).  By “collectively seeking the repeal of 
the [ATS],” suggests one human rights proponent, “the U.S. multinational business community has 
repudiated the public trust.”  Id. at 671. 
 187. NFTC et al. Brief, supra note 177, at 4.  The culprits, in the eyes of these business 
associations, are the human rights activists lobbying for a liberal interpretation of the ATS.  Id.  
“Foreign plaintiffs and the lawyers and organizations supporting them – often pursuing thinly 
disguised political agendas – have adopted the statute as a vehicle to embarrass foreign governments 
and to pressure businesses to abandon operations in targeted nations.”  Id.  However, the expense of 
ATS litigation might be a positive component.  Emeka Duruigbo, The Economic Cost of Alien Tort 
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the escalating litigation successfully squeezed through the door for alien 
tort claims against multinational corporations in U.S. federal courts – 
suggesting that Justice Souter’s slightly ajar door could easily be thrown 
open.189 
3.  U.S. Foreign Policy Implications 
The political branches of the U.S. government have much to 
consider after the Court’s decision in Sosa.190  The continued use of the 
 
Litigation: A Response to Awakening Monster: Alien Tort Statute of 1789, 14 MINN. J. GLOBAL 
TRADE 1, 30 (2004).  “It could be that at the end of the day, society would view the protection of 
human rights as an overwhelming consideration that trumps business interests, regardless of cost.”  
Id. 
 188. Magnusson, supra note 182, at 63.  The most notable of recent ATS suits was settled in 
early 2005.  Id.  The suit arose from the following summary of events: 
In the mid-1990s, reports emerged out of Burma that villagers in the remote Yadana 
region had been forced by the military to clear jungle for the construction of a $1.2 
billion natural gas pipeline.  The allegations were horrendous: To round up workers for 
the project, the Burmese military had resorted to torture, rape, and murder to enslave 
villagers, even throwing one woman’s baby in a fire after killing her husband.  Before 
long, U.S. human rights groups had filed suit against Unocal Corp., based in El Segundo, 
Calif., one of the four pipeline partners, on behalf of 15 unnamed Burmese villagers. 
Id.  Unocal has allegedly (court gag orders are still in place) settled the suit for $30 million in 
damages.  Id.  The settlement is significant because it hints at U.S. corporations accepting 
responsibility for their involvement in human rights violations.  Id.; see Doe v. Unocal Corp., 248 
F.3d 915 (9th Cir. 2001); see also Shannon O’Leary, Human Rights Case Sounds Alarm for U.S. 
Multinationals, CORPORATE LEGAL TIMES, December, 2004 (similarly summarizing the Doe v. 
Unocal Corp. case and connecting the settlement to other ATS litigation). 
 189. See generally HUFBAUER & MITROKOSTAS, AWAKENING MONSTER, supra note 7, at 13 
(anticipating litigation of the same magnitude as multi-billion dollar damages of the asbestos cases); 
Hufbauer & Mitrokostas, International Implications, supra note 7, at 615 (predicting the same).  
One observer offers a plan of action for corporations “to mitigate potential backlash while not 
curbing growth.”  Pinilla, supra note 179, at 719. 
This primarily involves thorough self-assessment and evaluations of local business 
practices.  Once this first step is taken, companies must try to influence partners abroad 
to meet international human rights standards, much like quality control standards 
imposed on foreign supply chain partners.  If emerging markets prove too enticing and 
immune from influence, corporations should take steps to create walls clearly separating 
themselves from irresponsible conduct and players while at the same time reducing the 
appearance that the commission of these violations is of benefit to corporate entities. 
Id.  ATS litigation is being lauded for raising awareness of human rights violations in the minds of 
corporate decision makers.  Shamir, supra note 185, at 660-61.  The ATS, “by forcing the issue of 
corporations and human rights into the open, already shapes corporate behavior because it forces 
corporations to reflect upon, if not to institutionalize, human rights-related issues.”  Id. 
 190. Although it was initially suggested that the United States itself would be exposed to 
litigation under the ATS because of the door left open by the Supreme Court, the combination of the 
ATS issue and the FTCA issue decided in Sosa likely will prohibit future claims that directly target 
the U.S. government.  Baluarte, supra note 89, at 11; see also supra note 90 (outlining the Court’s 
outcome on the FTCA claim). 
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ATS in its modern context conflicts with its original purpose such that it 
may threaten the status of international relations.191  The current 
administration views the interpretation of the ATS advanced by the 
Filartiga line of cases as dangerous.192  For an administration that has 
made considerable attempts to protect businesses and bolster the 
economy, it follows that it would encourage a narrow and literal 
interpretation of the ATS.193 But, beyond this business-friendly 
administration’s goal of preserving the economy and nurturing a 
receptive home for large players in that economy, the executive branch 
seeks to ensure that ATS litigation does not compromise its foreign 
policy strategies.194  The “War on Terror” presents additional concerns 
 
 191. Reply Brief for the United States as Respondents Supporting Petitioner, Sosa v. Alvarez-
Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004) (No. 03-339).  The discretion given to the circuits “would grant 
authority to the courts to engage in a function that the Constitution vests in the political branches” 
and “would permit the courts effectively to nullify the actions of the political branches in the realm 
of foreign affairs.”  Id. at 9.  Rather than serving as “a shield to protect foreign governmental 
officials from torts committed in the United States” – the original impetus for the ATS, see supra 
notes 25-30 and accompanying text (discussing the motives for the enactment of the ATS in 1789),  
– the ATS becomes “a sword to hold them civilly liable for tortious acts that took place abroad.”  
Bradley and Goldsmith, supra note 32, at 361.  This modern application of the ATS will not, for the 
most part, “promote amicable inter-national [sic] relations.”  Id.  If ATS litigation unfolds as 
estimated, “the United States will be widely castigated for imposing its brand of justice worldwide.”  
Hufbauer & Mitrokostas, International Implications, supra note 7, at 625.  The civil suits would 
entail the “American-style justice” of punitive damages and class actions.  HUFBAUER & 
MITROKOSTAS, AWAKENING MONSTER, supra note 7, at 48.  There is also the distinct possibility 
that the courts’ judgments will misrepresent to the international community the United States’ 
stance on controversial topics because 
[i]n ATS litigation, U.S. courts are called on to lay blame for international controversies. 
The entry of judgment in an ATS case may create the impression to citizens of other 
countries that the U.S. government has taken sides in an international dispute, which 
may interfere with the efforts of the executive branch and Congress to calibrate an 
appropriate foreign policy concerning a particular dispute. 
Garre, supra note 65 at 4.  The judicial branch’s “judgment on the actions of a foreign state .  .  . 
may well jeopardize sensitive negotiations.”  HUFBAUER & MITROKOSTAS, AWAKENING MONSTER, 
supra note 7, at 48. 
 192. Stephens, supra note 26, at 173.  In opposition to the ATS, the White House has sought 
“to shield human rights abusers from accountability in U.S. Courts and to grant the executive branch 
the sole power to pick and chose who should be held liable and in what forum.”  Id.; see also Leavy, 
supra note 182, at 818 (noting the Bush administration’s challenge of jurisdiction in the Sosa case). 
 193. Stephens, supra note 26, at 178.  Business organizations suggest that ATS litigation will 
not only disrupt the foreign policy agendas of the United States, but also interfere with its trade 
policy because the threat of ATS litigation discourages businesses from conducting trade as normal.  
NFTC et al. Brief, supra note 177, at 4.  “[T]he Bush Administration [has] argued that companies 
shouldn’t be held to a ‘vicarious liability’ standard but should instead be held blameless unless 
involved directly in the crimes.”  Magnusson, supra note 182, at 63; see also O’Leary, supra note 
188, at 68 (suggesting that U.S. corporations “have a powerful ally on its side” in the present 
presidential administration). 
 194. Defeis, supra note 178, at 322 (2004) (referring to the government position taken in a 
brief it filed on behalf of another ATS defendant “stating that if the case were allowed to go to trial, 
38
Akron Law Review, Vol. 39 [2006], Iss. 2, Art. 7
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol39/iss2/7
DAMORE1.DOC 4/14/2006  1:15:04 PM 
2006] SOSA V. ALVAREZ-MACHAIN 631 
for the Bush administration; in particular, its approach to the handling of 
prisoners has been highly controversial.195  Justice Souter was conscious 
of the fact that ATS litigation would elicit some foreign policy-making 
by the courts, advising that “[s]ince many attempts by federal courts to 
craft remedies for the violation of new norms of international law would 
raise risks of adverse foreign policy consequences, they should be 
undertaken, if at all, with great caution.”196 
4.  Action by Congress 
Perhaps the only way to truly remedy the cloudiness of the ATS is 
for Congress to address it.197  Justice Souter aptly cautioned against 
 
it would interfere with American foreign policy, and may disrupt the war on terrorism”).  See supra 
note 190 (describing some of the potential interference in U.S. foreign affairs). 
 195. Richey, supra note 3, at 2.  “[T]he Alien Tort Statute could complicate the Bush 
administration’s war on terror by subjecting foreign individuals assisting in the detention and 
questioning of Al Qaeda suspects to potential liability in US courts for alleged human rights abuses 
conducted in overseas jails and interrogation chambers.”  Richey, supra note 3, at 2.  See generally 
Juan E. Mendez, Review of David Cole’s Enemy Aliens: Double Standards and Constitutional 
Freedoms in the War on Terrorism, 30 J.C. & U.L. 493 (2004) (book review) (highlighting the 
United States’ obligations under international law specifically related to the detainees of  the War on 
Terror); Ronald J. Riccio, Court Rules on Power to Detain Prisoners of the War on Terror and on 
the Limits of the ‘Bush Doctrine,’ 177 N.J.L.J. 321 (2004) (discussing the Sosa decision as it relates 
to the detention of terrorist prisoners).  But see supra note 190 (discussing the only remote 
likelihood of the United States becoming directly subject to liability for its own human rights 
violations under the ATS as a result of the protection afforded by the FTCA).  But see Gonzales, 
supra note 182 (criticizing the attempt of the government and corporations to immunize themselves 
“from their misdeeds in foreign lands”).  “[I]f we lose sight of the weightiness of underlying ATS 
claims, all we need to do is glance at those damned Iraqi prisoner photos.”  Id. 
 196. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 727-28 (2004).  The federal courts, Justice 
Souter warned, should be “particularly wary of impinging on the discretion of the Legislative and 
Executive Branches in managing foreign affairs.”  Id. at 727.  It is interesting to note that, while 
Justice Souter advised caution when the courts tread on the ground of foreign policy-making, he did 
not specifically instruct the courts to avoid the area altogether.  Wilkinson, supra note 172, at 1694.  
Nevertheless, the Court “admonished the federal judiciary to exercise this power in a manner that 
would not trespass unduly upon the powers of the political branches in foreign affairs. Id. One 
recent scholar suggests that there is a history of judicial presence in foreign affairs.  Ariel N. 
Lavinbuk, Note, Rethinking Early Judicial Involvement in Foreign Affairs: An Empirical Study of 
the Supreme Court’s Docket, 114 YALE L.J. 855, 886 (2005).  Analyzing the types of international 
issues in which the courts involved themselves might be helpful in identifying “[t]he proper role for 
courts in foreign affairs.”  Id. at 896. 
 197. Hufbauer & Mitrokostas, International Implications, supra note 7, at 624.  “Whatever the 
result, only the creator of the beast may put it to proper purpose.”  Id.  “[I]t may prove difficult for 
the federal courts to arrest the sprawling sweep of ATS litigation in a timely fashion.  Hence our 
core recommendations are addressed to the Congress: legislation can most efficiently correct the 
unlimited sweep of ATS claims.”  HUFBAUER & MITROKOSTAS, AWAKENING MONSTER, supra note 
7, at 49.  At the least, Congress should specify whether the jurisdictional grant of the ATS also 
“allows for the creation of common law causes of action.”  Leading Case, supra note 46, at 456.  
“More specifically, Congress might step in to clarify the scope of its hoary grant of jurisdiction over 
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policy-making by the courts and recognized that the more appropriate 
action would be for Congress to make the ATS functional in today’s 
courts without requiring that the federal courts became international 
legislators.198  Rather than than asking the courts to decide what the 
international law is, lobbyists of both human rights groups and 
multinational corporations199 could more appropriately devote their 
energies toward Congress to enact protective legislation.200 
V.  CONCLUSION 
The unique history of the ATS warrants its preservation in the 
modern structure of our judiciary.201  The accepted interpretation of the 
Founding Fathers’ impetus for creating jurisdiction over the claims of 
aliens for certain international violations is not as prevalent today, but 
the spirit of their concern continues to resonate in present time.202  
 
alien tort claims, sparing courts a difficult and uncertain inquiry in every ATS case.”  Id. A 
proponent of the incorporation of customary international law into the U.S. legal system reminds us 
“that Congress has the authority to adopt legislation that would make [customary international law] 
applicable in federal courts” and proposes that Congress does so.  Aleinikoff, supra note 53, at 91-
92.  See also Bruce Zagaris, U.S. Supreme Court Overturns Alvarez-Machain Claim, But Upholds 
Alien Tort Law, INT’L ENFORCEMENT LAW REPORTER, September, 2004, (recognizing the most 
effective way to limit ATS litigation is for Congress to enact legislation to that effect). 
 198. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 727 (2004).  Justice Souter presented five 
deterrents to the federal courts’ recognition of causes of action under the ATS.  Id. at 725-728.  
“First, the prevailing conception of the common law has changed since 1789 in a way that counsels 
restraint in judicially applying internationally generated norms.” Id. at 725.  “Second, along with, 
and in part driven by that conceptual development in understanding common law has come an 
equally significant rethinking of the role of the federal courts in making it.”  Id. at 726 (citing Erie 
R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938)).  “Third, this Court has recently and repeatedly said that a 
decision to create a private right of action is one better left to legislative judgment in the great 
plurality of cases.”  Id. at 727. 
Fourth, the subject of those collateral consequences is itself a reason for a high bar to 
new private causes of action for violating international law, for the potential implications 
of foreign relations of the United States of recognizing such causes should make courts 
particularly wary of impinging on the discretion of the Legislative and Executive 
Branches in managing foreign affairs. 
Id.  Lastly, Justice Souter could find “no congressional mandate to seek out and define new and 
debatable violations of the law of nations, and modern indications of congressional understanding of 
the judicial role in the field have not affirmatively encouraged greater judicial creativity.”  Id. at 
728. 
 199. See supra note 177 for a list (in the form of those that filed amici brief in Sosa) of many 
organizations that would likely join this effort. 
 200. See generally Gonzales, supra note 182 (discussing the focus of energy put into pro- and 
anti-ATS decisions by the courts). 
 201. See supra notes 23-66 and accompanying text (discussing the historical context of the 
ATS). 
 202. See supra notes 23-66 and accompanying test (discussing the historical context of the 
ATS).  The United States continues with increasing frequency to be involved in international 
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However, the long period of stagnancy has raised several issues as to the 
proper scope of ATS litigation, along with issues that only became 
cognizable in our modern era: the impact of ATS litigation on 
multinational corporations and the growing need for adjudication of 
human rights violations.203  Until the ATS is definitively contained or 
fully expanded, human rights victims will continue to find novel 
arguments to employ the ATS,204 and multinational corporations will 
endeavor to shield themselves from litigation by arguing for Justice 
Scalia’s strict interpretation of the statute.205 So long as the door to the 
ATS remains even slightly ajar, numerous attempts to establish 
jurisdiction in federal courts under the ATS can be expected, as well as 
great opposition seeking to firmly shut the door to modern ATS claims. 
Carolyn A. D’Amore 
 
situations and prides itself in resolving various disputes. 
 203. See generally supra notes 175-200 (discussing the modern issues attached to the ATS). 
 204. See supra notes 176-182 and accompanying text (proposing the ways in which human 
rights litigation will employ the ATS to correct violations around the world). 
 205. See supra notes 183-189 and accompanying text (suggesting the resistance of U.S. 
corporations to litigation under the ATS). 
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